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PREFACE 
In March 2002 the NSW Attorney General asked the Law Reform 
Commission to conduct an inquiry into whether people who are 
profoundly deaf or have a significant hearing or sight impairment 
should be able to serve as jurors. While the Jury Act 1977 (NSW) does 
not specifically exclude people who are deaf or blind, there had been 
an administrative determination that they could not fulfil the duties of 
a juror. 
In February 2004 the Commission published a Discussion paper and 
invited submissions and comments.  
A key issue which arose in the course of the Law Reform Commission’s 
work in relation to deaf jurors was the use of signed language 
interpreters and the challenge of translating difficult legal concepts 
using Auslan. In order to gain a better understanding of this issue the 
Commission consulted with Dr Jemina Napier, an expert in signed 
language interpreting, who devised a number of back translation 
exercises using transcript from a Supreme Court trial.   
These initial back translation exercises identified the need for a more 
detailed study. The results of a further study form the basis of this 
Research Report. The study used a judge’s summing up in a criminal 
trial to assess the accuracy of the interpretation and the level of 
comprehension of potential deaf jurors compared to hearing jurors. Six 
deaf and six hearing people acted as jurors. Excerpts from the 
summing up were interpreted into Auslan and filmed. Two versions of 
a comprehension test were prepared in Auslan and English to check 
both the understanding of the facts and the legal concepts. The jurors 
completed the comprehension test in either Auslan or English. 
The study provided significant insights to the Law Reform 
Commission in preparing its Report 114, Blind or Deaf Jurors 
(September 2006). The study was conducted by researchers at 
Macquarie University: Dr Jemina Napier, Department of Linguistics, 
Mr David Spencer, Department of Law and Mr Joe Sabolcec, post 
graduate student, Macquarie University. Funding for the project was 
provided by the Macquarie University External Collaborative Grants 
Scheme and the NSW Law Reform Commission.  
 
Peter Hennessy 
Executive Director 
NSW Law Reform Commission 
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Most research on legal interpreting to date has focused on court 
interpreting. Typically the person requiring the interpreter is the 
victim, witness, defendant or complainant. No linguistic studies have 
been carried out on the efficacy of interpreting for the purposes of a 
deaf juror. In order to assess the ability of deaf jurors to access court 
proceedings via signed language interpreters, this pilot study sought 
to investigate: 
1. the ability of legal concepts to be translated from English into 
Auslan; and 
2. the level of comprehension of six deaf jurors as compared to a 
control group of six hearing jurors 
Quantitative and qualitative approaches involving post-test 
interviews, content and discourse analyses found that an 
interpretation from English into Auslan was highly accurate and that 
there was no significant difference in the level of comprehension 
between deaf and hearing participants. The conclusion is that with 
trained and skilled interpreters, deaf people could effectively access 
court proceedings via signed language interpreters, and perform their 
function as jurors, although further research is needed to investigate 
this issue in more depth. 
This report details the findings of the study. 
 Section 1 provides an introduction to the issue of deaf people 
serving as jurors, and the impetus for this research study. 
 Section 2 gives an overview of the relevant literature to 
foreground the study. 
 Section 3 introduces the research questions explored. 
 Section 4 discusses the preliminary study which led to the 
research reported in this publication. 
 Section 5 provides details of the methodology and results for 
this study. 
 Sections 6 and 7 discuss the findings and implications of this 
research. 
 Section 8 contains recommendations and suggestions for further 
research. 
 
  
 
1. Introduction 
 
 Background  
 Law reform in New South Wales, Australia 
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BACKGROUND 
The participation in juries by representatives of the community 
is a fundamental element of the administration of justice, and 
thus serves the interests of the State. Jury service, like voting, is 
a right and obligation of citizenship [of Australia]…1  
The institution of trial by jury, although not without critics, has 
been regarded for centuries as a fundamental part of the 
administration of justice. Its features are credited with helping to 
secure the protection of the community from the tyranny of 
absolutism and the self-interest of the powerful, while reflecting 
democratic ideals and representing current social values and 
attitudes…The jury is thus a group of “ordinary” people, 
disinterested in the outcome of the trial, and independent of 
powerful and influential social forces.2 
1.1 In most English-speaking countries, such as Australia and the 
United Kingdom, non-English speakers are not allowed to serve as 
jurors as they cannot access the language of the court. So what about 
deaf people? Some may be competent English users, but not able to 
access the language of the court due to not being able to hear it. But 
technically they could access all other written information in the form 
of evidence, testimonies, and written confessions.  
1.2 Currently, deaf people cannot serve as jurors in Australia or in 
most other countries in the world. Debates over whether deaf people 
should be permitted to serve as jurors have long featured in legal 
journals.3 Current policy in the majority of countries states that deaf 
people are not capable of serving as jurors, due to their ‘incapacity’ or 
disability, that is, their hearing loss.  
1.3 The United States has led the way with respect to law reform on 
this issue, with many States now allowing deaf people to serve as 
jurors, and with provisions for interpreters for deaf jurors.4 Deaf 
people cannot serve as jurors in British or Irish criminal courts due to 
legal issues with having a thirteenth person (ie, interpreter) in the 
jury room;5 however, a deaf woman has served as a juror in a British 
Coroner’s Court.6  
                                                
1. NSWLRC, DP 46, 2004, [1.4]. 
2. NSWLRC, DP 46, 2004, [2.8]. 
3. Golbas, 1981; Silas, 1993. 
4. Ellman, 1992; LSS, 2000. 
5. Deaf Blawg, 2006; Enright, 1999. 
6. Barber, 2005. 
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1.4 With the introduction of the New Zealand Sign Language 
(NZSL) Bill before parliament in 20057 to have NZSL recognised as an 
official language and for use in legal proceedings, a deaf man residing 
in New Zealand was permitted to serve as a juror for the first time in 
a tax fraud case.8 In an interview with the New Zealand National 
Equal Opportunities Network, David McKee stated that he had been 
“quite excited about the jury duty because [he] knew [he]’d be 
breaking down barriers and opening doors for other deaf people who in 
the future wanted to participate”.9 He also acknowledged that the 
judge might have been open to having him on the jury, and 
interpreters in the court and jury room, because of the NZSL Bill.10  
LAW REFORM IN NEW SOUTH WALES, AUSTRALIA 
1.5 Given that the notion of deaf people serving as jurors is 
obviously on the law reform agenda in some countries, the 
consideration given in Australia to this issue is timely. In March 2002, 
the New South Wales (NSW)11 Attorney General requested the New 
South Wales Law Reform Commission (NSWLRC) to investigate 
whether deaf and blind persons ought to be able to serve on juries in 
criminal courts. The terms of reference were: 
To inquire into and to report on whether persons who are 
profoundly deaf or have a significant hearing or sight 
impairment should be able to serve as jurors in New South Wales 
and, if so, in what circumstances. In undertaking this review, the 
Commission should have regard to the Anti-Discrimination Act 
1977 (NSW), the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 
(Commonwealth), and the need to maintain confidence in the 
administration of justice in New South Wales.12 
1.6 The NSWLRC established a reference group comprising Phillip 
French, Graeme Innes, Professor Ron McCallum, Alastair McEwin 
and Alison Herridge. A Discussion Paper outlining the issues to be 
                                                
7. The third and final reading of the NZSL Bill was passed on 6 April 2006, and 
received royal assent on 10 April 2006. The NZSL Act is thus now enshrined 
in New Zealand law and recognises NZSL as New Zealand’s third official 
language alongside English and Te Reo Maori. 
8. The Dominion Post, 2005. 
9. NEON, 2006. 
10. Travaglia, 2005. 
11. New South Wales (capital: Sydney) is an Australian State. Australia has six 
States and two self-governing territories with independent criminal 
jurisdictions. 
12. NSWLRC, DP 46, 2004, p v. 
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considered was published in 2004.13  The Discussion Paper invited 
submissions from interested people and organisations.  
1.7 In reviewing law reform concerning deaf jurors in other 
countries, the Discussion Paper noted: 
5.23 One issue relating to jury service by deaf people is that the 
presence of a sign language interpreter in the deliberation room 
violates the rule excluding persons other than the jurors in that 
room. In Eckstein v Kirby, the US District Court ruled that it did, 
noting that secrecy must be preserved to guarantee a vigorous 
and candid discussion of the issues by the jurors. However, some 
courts have held that the rule excluding persons other than 
jurors from the jury room during deliberations does not apply to 
sign language interpreters based on a number of reasons. First, 
the rule is said to apply in reality only to officers of the court 
such as bailiffs, judges or counsel, who because of their 
(perceived or actual) capacity to influence the jurors, might 
inhibit free discussion. This danger would not arise in the case of 
an interpreter who performs a purely mechanical function, much 
like a hearing aid, microphone or typewriter. Absent any 
evidence of inappropriate behaviour on the part of an interpreter, 
the jurors are unlikely to perceive him or her as having any 
influence on or capacity to pressure any of them. Also, the judge 
may give instructions to both the interpreter and the jury that 
participation by the former is improper. Secondly, jury secrecy 
would not be endangered since there are legal and ethical rules 
preventing interpreters from revealing confidences made during 
jury deliberations. Finally, practical experience has shown that 
none of the anticipated problems have arisen. In those 
jurisdictions where deaf people have been sworn, interpreters 
accompanied the jurors in the jury room, and there has never 
been a breach of confidentiality, nor problems with the 
interpreter breaching the oath of non-involvement, nor any 
problem with respect to the panel not being able effectively to 
deliberate because of the presence of the interpreter.  
5.24 A number of States have adopted legislation or court rules 
allowing an interpreter to accompany a deaf juror during 
deliberations. Some contain safeguards such as specifying that 
the interpreter will only act to communicate for and to the juror 
with the disability, or should refrain from personal interjection 
and uphold the secrecy of the proceeding.14 
1.8 Thus, early on, the presence of an interpreter as a thirteenth 
person in the jury room was not considered necessarily to be an issue. 
                                                
13. NSWLRC, DP 46 2004. 
14. NSWLRC, DP 46, 2004, [5.23]-[5.24]. 
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However, although it was accepted that signed language interpreters 
are regularly used in criminal courts in order to provide witnesses, 
complainants and defendants with access to court proceedings, it was 
felt that jurors require a different level of access to information. 
Jurors do not just need access to the proceedings in a courtroom, they 
need to make informed decisions about the status of a person’s guilt in 
committing a crime, and need to be able to participate in jury 
deliberations. The American case, People v Guzman,15 pointed out: 
At a minimum, a juror must be able to understand all of the 
evidence presented, evaluate that evidence in a rational manner, 
communicate effectively with the other jurors during 
deliberations, and comprehend the applicable legal principles, as 
instructed by the court.16 
1.9 Given this difference, concerns were raised in relation to the 
interpretation of evidence, interpretation of the submissions of 
counsel, interpretation of a judge’s directions to the jury, and 
interpretation of jury room deliberations. Essentially, questions were 
raised about whether deaf people can sufficiently comprehend legal 
proceedings when relying on a signed language interpreter, in order to 
get full access to the facts of a case and thus make an informed 
decision about a person’s guilt. 
1.10 The notion of whether hearing people can sufficiently 
comprehend court proceedings in order to carry out their role as jurors 
effectively was acknowledged in the Discussion Paper:  
Any juror may perform below the standard expected, due to such 
factors as his or her individual attention span, boredom 
threshold, lack of interest in the matter being tried, the trial’s 
length and unpredictable external events. Any juror may bring 
his or her prejudices, such as racism or distrust of police or 
authority, to the jury room. In addition…although using the 
same evidence, different jurors will reach different conclusions, 
despite having the use of the same senses. Nearly all 
commentators agree that juries have great difficulty 
understanding and applying judicial instructions.17 
1.11 Following further consultation, the NSWLRC decided that 
empirical evidence was needed to assess two key issues: 
1. whether legal concepts could be translated from English into 
Australian Sign Language (Auslan); and 
                                                
15. People v Guzman 76 NY 2d 1 (1990), 5. 
16. NSWLRC, DP 46, 2004, [2.7]. 
17. NSWLRC, DP 46, 2004, [2.20]. 
  
RR 14  D e a f  j u r o r s ’  a c c e s s  t o  c o u r t  p r o c e e d i n g s  v i a  s i g n  l a n g u a g e  
i n t e r p r e t i n g :  A n  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  
6 
2. whether deaf jurors could access court proceedings through an 
Auslan/English interpreter. 
1.12 The NSWLRC decided that the notion of deaf juror access to jury 
deliberations should be considered separately, as it was felt that the 
essential initial issues were related to accuracy and comprehension. 
Thus the NSWLRC commissioned a study in order to explore the 
linguistic and interpreting issues that potential deaf jurors faced in 
accessing court proceedings. The study was jointly funded by the 
NSWLRC and the Macquarie University External Collaborative Grant 
Scheme. 
1.13 The overall goal of the study was to consider deaf people’s access 
to court proceedings in the role of juror rather than as a complainant, 
defendant or witness, and to present evidence relating to the issues 
that arise in considering any proposal for the empanelment of deaf 
jurors in NSW criminal courts. This Research Report outlines the 
various stages of the research, the findings and recommendations, and 
concludes with suggestions for further study. 
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2.1 This literature review provides an overview of issues relevant to 
this study, with a survey of key factors that need to be considered 
when assessing deaf jurors’ comprehension of the interpretation of 
courtroom proceedings. Thus we draw on research relating to 
linguistic, signed and spoken language interpreting in order to discuss 
legal interpreting and the role of the legal interpreter, legal discourse 
and interpreting for courtroom discourse, interpreting for jurors, legal 
text comprehension and comprehension testing. 
LEGAL INTERPRETING 
2.2 Most research and discussion on legal interpreting focuses on 
court interpreting, with a reasonably large body of literature that 
discusses courtroom interpreting practice, the role of the court 
interpreter, and ethical dilemmas faced by court interpreters.18  
2.3 There has been some discussion of other aspects of legal 
interpreting, such as solicitor-client interviews, police interviews, 
police interrogations and confessions, tribunals or 
immigration/refugee hearings.19 
2.4 In Australia, there have been several publications which explore 
the cultural barriers for Aboriginal people in accessing court 
proceedings.20 In all aspects of legal interpreting, the person typically 
requiring the interpreter is the victim, witness, defendant or 
complainant, although there are cases of deaf lawyers relying on 
signed language interpreters.21 
2.5 In Australia, any interpreter who works in court must be 
accredited by the National Accreditation Authority for Translators 
and Interpreters (NAATI) at the professional interpreter level, which 
is the minimum standard for professional practice in Australia. 
The role of the legal interpreter 
2.6 Much of the literature concerning legal interpreting focuses on 
the role of the legal interpreter, and the challenges of working in the 
                                                
18. For example, Angelelli, 2004; Carroll, 1995; Colin and Morris, 1996; 
Edwards, 1995; Fenton, 1997; Fowler, 1997; Gonzalez, Vasquez, and 
Mikkelson, 1992; Kadric, 2000; Kelly, 2000; Lane, McKenzie-Bridle, and 
Curtis, 1999; Mathers, 2006; Mikkelson, 1998, 2000; Morris, 1999; Robinson, 
1994; Schweda Nicholson, 1994. 
19. Barsky, 1996; Fowler, 2003; J I E Gibbons, (p ) 1995; Krouglov, 1999; Maley, 
Candlin, Koster, and Crichton, 1995; Pöllabauer, 2004; R. Shuy, 1998; 
Zambrano, 2006. 
20. Cooke, 2002; Eades, 2003; Fryer-Smith, 2002; Goldflam, 1995; Howard, 
Quinn, Blokland, and Flynn, 1993. 
21. Kurlander, in press. 
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legal system due to potentially conflicting expectations from different 
stakeholders involved in the process. 
2.7 The case of Gaio v The Queen22 has been influential in 
determining the court’s view of the interpreter’s role in Australia.  In 
this case, the High Court of Australia had to determine whether a 
confession to a patrol officer via an interpreter was admissible as 
evidence before a court, or whether the confession should be 
considered as hearsay because it was not obtained directly, but rather 
indirectly via an intermediary (ie, an interpreter). The debate focused 
on the role of the interpreter, in order to clarify this issue. The court 
concluded that if the interpreter translated ‘word by word’ or ‘sentence 
by sentence’ and remained faithful and accurate to the original 
message, then the translation should not be deemed as hearsay.  
2.8 This judgment perpetuates the notion among legal professionals 
that the more literal a translation, the more correct it is likely to be, 
and that interpreters should function in ‘conduit’ mode, like a 
telephone, relaying the content of a message without having any 
influence on that message.23 Realistically, however, interpreter 
practitioners know that in order to convey the content of a message 
effectively, they should function as a linguistic and cultural mediator 
and ensure that the disadvantaged minority language speaker has full 
access to court proceedings and understands what is going on.24 
2.9 In order to explore these differing perceptions, Banna25 
interviewed three signed and three spoken language interpreters, and 
three legal professionals, about their experiences with interpreting in 
the courtroom.  The legal professionals and the spoken language 
interpreters were found to have similar expectations to those 
expressed in the Gaio case, in terms of the interpreter functioning in a 
conduit role.  The signed language interpreters, however, leaned more 
towards the ally role, and were focused on ensuring equal access to 
court proceedings.  
2.10 This approach is highlighted in another decisive case in terms of 
the interpreter role – that of Gradidge v Grace Bros Pty Ltd26 in the 
New South Wales27 Supreme Court. In this case, a signed language 
interpreter was held in contempt of court when she continued to 
                                                
22. (1960) 104 CLR 419. 
23. Laster and Taylor, 1994; Mikkelson, 1998. 
24. Berk-Seligson, 1990; Brennan and Brown, 1997. 
25. Banna, 2004. 
26. (1988) 93 FLR 414; Roberts-Smith, Frey, and Bessell-Browne, 1990. 
27. New South Wales (capital: Sydney) is an Australian State. Australia has six 
States and two self-governing territories with independent criminal 
jurisdictions. 
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interpret for an argument between counsel, after she had been 
directed to stop interpreting by the judge. Her rationale for continuing 
was that it was her role to provide access to everything spoken in the 
courtroom to her deaf client. After being taken to the Supreme Court, 
the contempt decision was withdrawn, as it was decided that the deaf 
client was entitled to have the argument interpreted as long as she 
was present in the courtroom, so that she could ‘see’ the argument the 
same way that everybody else could hear it.  
2.11 In a study of British Sign Language (BSL) interpreters working 
in court, Turner and Brown28 also found that the interpreters did not 
adhere to a conduit model of interpreting, and instead participated in 
co-construction of the message with their deaf clients. Thus, they 
suggest that a different perspective is needed with regards to the role 
of an interpreter in the courtroom.  They advocate for recognition of 
interpreters’ linguistic and cultural expertise as coordinators of 
interaction between people who do not use the same language, as a 
means of enhancing the quality of the judicial process.  
2.12 With respect to deaf people’s involvement in the legal system, 
there have been a number of publications that specifically discuss deaf 
people’s access to justice via signed language interpreters.29 Katrina 
Miller and Vernon McCay have contributed significantly with their 
discussions of the potential linguistic barriers that deaf people face in 
the legal system.30 
2.13 All of these discussions have focused on the deaf person as a 
member of a minority group being disadvantaged in accessing the 
legal system. In all of these publications, the role of the interpreter 
has been considered in light of the position of the client as a 
participant in the legal system as a defendant, witness, or 
complainant. None have considered what the role of an interpreter 
might be in working with a juror. This is probably because non-
English speaking people have not historically been allowed to serve on 
juries. Similarly, deaf people have traditionally been excluded from 
serving on juries. This situation is beginning to change, however, and 
the notion of interpreting for jurors is discussed further in paragraphs 
2.38 - 2.42.  
                                                
28. Turner and Brown, 2001. 
29. Brennan, 1999; Fournier, 1997; K Miller, 2001; K Miller and McCay, 1994; 
Nardi, 2005; Russell, 2002; Stevens, 2005; Tilbury, 2005; G Turner, 1995; 
Wilcox, 1995. 
30. McCay and Miller, 2001, 2005; K Miller, 2003; K R Miller and McCay, 2001. 
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LEGAL DISCOURSE 
2.14 Regardless of the role of the client, legal discourse will always 
provide challenges for interpreters of any language. Legal discourse 
encompasses various relationships between language use and the 
realm of law. Forensic linguistics is the branch of linguistics that 
applies discourse analysis to legal contexts, and identifies clear 
features of linguistic behaviour.31  The challenge for interpreters does 
not only relate to legal terminology, but also to how language is used 
in legal contexts.  
2.15 Legal language (or ‘legalese’) differs from colloquial language on 
lexical, semantic, and syntactic levels, and in particular, the nature of 
courtroom interaction influences the type of language used.  
2.16 It is for this reason that the legal discourse used by lawyers and 
judges in the courtroom is often found to be too complicated for the 
layperson to comprehend. Berk-Seligson32 identifies a number of 
factors that lead to this level of complexity, including the practice of 
oral legalese often being written to be read aloud. Berk-Seligson refers 
to the work of Danet33 in discussing nine lexical features of legal 
English: (1) technical terms; (2) common terms with an uncommon 
meaning; (3) words whose origin is Latin, French or Old English; (4) 
polysyllabic words; (5) unusual prepositional phrases; (6) doublets 
(combination of Anglo-Saxon words with French or Latin words); (7) 
formality; (8) vagueness; and (9) over-precision. 
2.17 Berk-Seligson also refers to 11 syntactic features of legal 
English: (1) nominalizations; (2) passive constructions; (3) 
conditionals; (4) unusual anaphora; (5) whiz deletion (deletion of 
relative pronouns); (6) high frequency of prepositional phrases and 
their unusual placement between the subject and predicate of a 
sentence; (7) lengthy sentences; (8) unique determiners; (9) 
impersonality; (10) wide variety of semantically negative words; and 
(11) parallel structure in the linking of words and phrases by means of 
conjunctions ‘or’ and ‘and’. Berk-Seligson also states that discourse 
features in legalese which contribute to incomprehensibility include 
lack of cohesion and overly compact sentences. 
2.18 Further features of legal discourse include information seeking, 
clarification, reframing, reformulation, paraphrasing, summarizing, 
option-presenting, questioning strategies, testimony as narrative, 
double negatives, hedges, hesitation fillers, polite forms, question-
                                                
31. J Gibbons, 1999; J Gibbons, 2003; Olsson, 2004; R Shuy, 2001, 2003. 
32. Berk-Seligson, 1990. 
33. Danet, 1980. 
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intonation statements, intensifiers, direct speech, and answering 
questions (“is it not true that…”).34 
2.19 Conley and O’Barr35 investigated language use in trials, and 
noted that courtroom language is deliberately manipulated by lawyers 
in order to influence the credibility of witnesses. Strategies used 
include, for example, abrupt topic shifts and returns, use of tag 
questions (eg, isn’t that correct?), and use of silence (either witness’s 
silence treated as problematic or silence after testimony as inference 
of witness credibility). 
2.20 In his analysis of courtroom cross-examinations, Drew36 states 
that courtroom participants co-construct a hostile system of cross-
examination, with contrasting versions of the story via turn design 
within interactional sequences of cross-examination, following a 
specialised sequence of questions and answers. Lawyers design 
questions to discredit witnesses, paying particular attention to 
inconsistencies in witness testimony.  Witnesses behave in a guarded 
fashion and give defensive answers. In addition, lawyers will critique 
statements based on semantics (eg, knocking vs banging on the door) 
and use partial repeats to emphasise understanding. Drew concludes 
that this interaction is all designed for an “overhearing audience” (ie, 
the jury), who then make inferences about the events and then make 
their decision regarding guilt. 
2.21 Gibbons37 states that these particular forms of language use are 
adopted to maintain power in the court. He refers to the following 
strategies used by the court to maintain authority: (a) use of specialist 
language; (b) control of turn-taking in the courtroom; (c) formality; (d) 
address forms; (e) coercion in questioning; and (f) rules of interaction 
of the courtroom. 
2.22 The complexities of legal discourse present two challenges of 
interest to this study in relation to the key research questions:  
 How well do lay people understand legal discourse? 
 How accurately can interpreters convey the terminology, 
strategies and conventions used in courtroom discourse in order 
to match the intention of the speaker? 
                                                
34. Tiersma, 1999. 
35. Conley and O’Barr, 1998. 
36. Drew, 1990. 
37. Gibbons, 2003. 
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INTERPRETING COURTROOM DISCOURSE 
2.23 Several in-depth linguistic studies, with spoken and signed 
language interpreters, have explored the complexities involved when 
interpreting in court, with the analysis of pragmatics and discourse in 
courtrooms, and in particular the challenges of interpreting legalese.  
Spoken language interpreting studies 
2.24 Observation and analysis of English-Spanish interpreted 
interactions in the courtroom in the United States38 and in Australia39 
have demonstrated that interpreters make a range of linguistic 
decisions during the interpreting process based on their 
understanding of courtroom discourse, which influences elements of 
the interaction, such as turn taking, pragmatic force, interruptions or 
clarifications, variation in register, discourse markers and politeness. 
Thus, as an inherent part of the process of interpreting, the 
interpreter alters the dynamics and therefore impacts on the 
interaction. 
2.25 It has also been suggested that in influencing language and 
interaction in the courtroom, the interpreter challenges the authority 
of the court and the lawyers in the courtroom.40 Gibbons41 suggests 
that lawyers often feel discomfort about working with interpreters due 
to loss of control over the discourse, misunderstanding the 
interpreting process, and the fact that an interpreter does not function 
as a conduit.   
2.26 These studies of spoken language interpretation of courtroom 
discourse have also informed the practices of signed language 
interpreters in court, as the linguistic, pragmatic and power dynamics 
present challenges for all interpreters alike, regardless of the 
languages actually being used. There are two specific studies, 
however, that have advanced our understanding of signed language 
interpretation of courtroom discourse. 
Signed language interpreting studies 
2.27 Brennan and Brown42 conducted a major study to assess the 
extent of deaf people’s access to justice in the UK. They observed 
British Sign Language (BSL) interpreters working in court, 
                                                
38. Berk-Seligson, 1990, 2002. 
39. S Hale, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c, 1999, 2001, 2002; S Hale and Gibbons, 
1999. 
40. Berk-Seligson, 1990; Brennan and Brown, 2004; J Gibbons, 2003; S Hale and 
Gibbons, 1999; S B Hale, 2004. 
41. Gibbons, 1999. 
42. Brennan and Brown, 1997. 
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administered a survey of legal interpreters, and interviewed deaf 
people and interpreters about their legal interpreting experiences in 
police, court and other legal settings. They highlight the fact that 
signed language interpreters experience conflict in terms of 
perceptions of their role.  However, the most interesting aspect of their 
study is their discussion of linguistic issues. In addition to the 
linguistic and discourse challenges faced by interpreters of all 
languages, signed language interpreters work bimodally, that is, 
between two languages that are expressed in different modalities (ie, 
spoken and visual-gestural). This presents further challenges for 
interpreters, as Brennan and Brown explain: 
BSL encodes visual information as a matter of course. Let us 
imagine what might seem like a fairly straightforward piece of 
information: person X recounts how he went into a pub, bought a 
pint of beer and was short-changed by the bar-tender. We know 
that in English we could embellish this account in all sorts of 
ways, but a typical BSL account would include certain types of 
visual information automatically; it would be more unusual to 
exclude those than to include them. Thus, we may well be able to 
glean from the BSL account what kind of doors the pub had, e.g., 
double swing doors, a single swing door, a door with a round 
knob or a door with a vertical handle; we may be able to discern 
that the bar-tender was a large man with stubble and a cigarette 
hanging out of his mouth; we may be able to tell that the counter 
was curved, that the place was crowded and X had to elbow his 
way in and so on. Now it is quite possible to present all of this 
information in the English language. However, when we say ‘I 
went into a pub’ in English we do not typically add information 
which indicates how we went in, what kind of door we opened, 
what kind of handle it had and so on. In BSL, not only is it 
typical to include such information, it is often unavoidable.43 
2.28 This level of visual encoding may provide a challenge for a 
signed language interpreter, for example, who hears the phrase ‘I ran 
up the stairs’ in English. How should the phrase be interpreted into a 
signed language? What kind of staircase is it? Is it a spiral staircase or 
a staggered staircase? The interpreter is then faced with a dilemma—
do they interrupt proceedings to clarify in order that the deaf person 
accesses the right information? How important is it that they give 
visually accurate information? Likewise, in the other direction, if a 
deaf person signs that he ran up a spiral staircase—does the 
interpreter voice-over that level of detail? It may sound strange to 
someone to hear the sentence ‘I ran up a spiral staircase’ as people do 
not normally provide that level of detail in English. Thus if people are 
                                                
43. Brennan and Brown, 1997, 121-122. 
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perturbed by what they hear, they may question the credibility of the 
person speaking. This has potentially major ramifications for deaf 
people in the justice system.  
2.29 This issue is particularly relevant to the use of super-ordinate 
terms which often come up in court, such as ‘murder’, which do not 
have one established sign in BSL (or Auslan). Instead people usually 
give examples of what it could be, perhaps signing STRANGLE, STAB, 
SHOOT, or SLIT-THROAT,44 and either with or without mouthing the 
word ‘murder’ and fingerspelling M-U-R-D-E-R. Fingerspelling and 
mouthing English words on the lips are common strategies used by 
signed language users, which Brennan and Brown discuss in depth, 
and which Brennan has discussed elsewhere.45  Such strategies are 
referred to as ‘borrowing’. Brennan46 describes how BSL users utilise 
fingerspelling and lip patterns (mouthing) to borrow English words 
strategically into BSL. The key points that she raises include: 
 initialised signs are a common form of borrowing (eg, 
CONFIDENCE); 
 fingerspelling is used to introduce new or technical terms; 
 mouthing of full English words typically co-occurs with 
production of fingerspelled items or abbreviated signs; 
 mouthing of full English words co-occurring with established 
signs is used to introduce a different register (eg, mouthing 
‘injury’ while signing HURT).  
2.30 These strategies have also been observed in deaf people and 
interpreters using American Sign Language (ASL),47 Italian Sign 
Language (LIS),48 and Auslan.49 This linguistic phenomenon is a 
result of language contact, where linguistic features are transferred 
from one language to another at different levels of language.50 The 
borrowing described by Brennan51 is a form of language contact 
between signed and spoken languages, also referred to as code-
                                                
44. Sign language transcription typically involves the ‘glossing’ of signs using 
English words for established signs (eg, MOTHER), two words joined 
together to represent the meaning of one sign (eg, RUN-FAST) and letters 
divided by hyphens to indicate a fingerspelled word (e.g., L-E-G-A-L) 
(Johnston and Schembri, 2007). 
45. Brennan, 2001. 
46. Brennan, 2001. 
47. Davis, 1990, 2003; Lucas and Valli, 1992. 
48. Fontana, 1999. 
49. Johnston, 2002; J Napier, 2006. 
50. Clyne, 2003. 
51. Brennan, 2001. 
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mixing52 or code-blending.53 This borrowing strategy used by 
interpreters can be referred to as a literal translation style. This style 
is commonly used in contexts where participants need to access formal 
registers of language, technical terms or context specific language use, 
such as university lectures.54 
2.31 Brennan and Brown,55 and Brennan56 essentially discuss court 
interpreters’ use of literal translation, borrowing from English as a 
linguistic strategy, in order to cope with legalese and to convey legal 
concepts effectively. Their research is particularly relevant to one of 
the research questions for this study, in relation to how accurately 
Auslan can convey legal concepts. 
2.32 Another significant investigation of signed language interpreting 
in court was conducted by Russell.57 She investigated the accuracy of 
Canadian English-ASL interpretations in courtroom discourse by 
contrasting the outcomes of simultaneous and consecutive 
interpreting approaches.58  
2.33 Spoken language interpreters typically work in simultaneous 
whispered mode, or long or short consecutive mode when working in 
court. Yet signed language interpreters typically work simultaneously 
as they work between a ‘silent’ and a spoken language, so there is no 
apparent intrusion between languages as is evident with spoken 
language interpreting. Research has identified that consecutive 
interpretations can be more accurate, due to the fact that interpreters 
have time to process the message and search for equivalence in the 
target language without interference from the source language.59  
                                                
52. Lucas and Valli, 1992. 
53. Emmorey, Borenstein, and Thompson, 2003. 
54. J Napier, 2002. 
55. Brennan and Brown, 1997. 
56. Brennan, 2001. 
57. Russell, 2002. 
58. “Consecutive interpreting is where a speaker/signer delivers their message 
in. discrete chunks, pausing for the interpreter to pass on each piece of the 
message. These segments can be as short as a phrase or as long as the entire 
speech, but are commonly around 300–600 words…Interpreters working 
consecutively often rely on note-taking to aid retention of information within 
each chunk”: Napier, McKee and Goswell, 2006, 15. 
 “Simultaneous interpreting is where the speaker/signer talks continuously, 
while the interpreter passes their message on as soon as they hear/see 
enough to understand…. When interpreters are working in simultaneous 
mode, they generally do not know what the speaker will say, or mean, until 
they have said it. So rather than starting their interpreting at exactly the 
same time as the speaker, there is always some time lag”: Napier, McKee 
and Goswell, 2006, 16. 
59. Stone, 2005. 
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Russell sought to investigate which technique would be more effective 
in court. 
2.34 In her study, Russell60 conducted four mock trials with real 
judges and lawyers, some with experience of working with spoken and 
signed language interpreters.  The interpreters worked in either the 
consecutive or simultaneous mode. Three different discourse events 
were analysed:  
(i) entering of direct evidence; 
(ii) cross-examination; and  
(iii) expert witness testimony.  
Russell found a statistically significant difference in terms of accuracy, 
with simultaneous interpretations 87% accurate, as compared with 
consecutive interpretations, which were 95% accurate. 
2.35 Post-trial interviews with participants revealed that the lawyers 
and judges seemed to prefer experiencing interpretation in the 
simultaneous mode, especially during the cross-examination (for the 
lawyers). They stressed the importance of preparation with 
interpreters, and that interpreters should request permission from the 
judge to clarify information, or consult with one another. Deaf 
witnesses said that interpreters should be confident and well 
prepared.  The expert witness felt that it was important to prepare 
with interpreters, and commented that they did not seem comfortable 
using the consecutive approach or note-taking. The interpreters also 
stressed the importance of preparation, and recognised that the 
quality of their interpreting was better when they used the 
consecutive mode. 
2.36 In summary, Russell stated that interpreters should recognise 
the value of using consecutive or simultaneous interpreting techniques 
for different discourse types in court, and should negotiate carefully 
with lawyers and judges about what strategies to use and when. 
2.37 Although informative in terms of signed language interpretation 
in court, these studies focused on interpreting for people who are 
accessing the justice system, in the form of witnesses, defendants or 
complainants. The results of the study set out in this Research Report 
are seminal, because it is the first linguistic study to examine signed 
language interpretation for deaf jurors in the court system.  
                                                
60. Russell, 2002. 
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INTERPRETING FOR JURORS 
2.38 In the interpreting literature, very little consideration has been 
given to interpreting for jurors, as people are typically not eligible to 
serve as jurors if they cannot understand the language of the court. 
Non-English speaking people can now serve as jurors in the state of 
New Mexico in the United States.61 Additionally, deaf people in some 
states in the US, and also in New Zealand, can serve as jurors, as it 
has been established that they are prevented from accessing the 
language of the court due to hearing loss, rather than the fact that 
they cannot use English (as discussed in paragraph 1.2). 
2.39 There are different challenges for interpreters working with 
jurors, because the role of the client is different.  The goal of the 
interpretation is also different.62 The role of a juror is:  
to listen and accurately remember each piece of evidence, where 
necessary to draw inferences of fact from that evidence, using 
their experience of everyday life and at the same time evaluate 
the credibility of witnesses and the relative importance of 
evidence… to understand and apply directions individually and, 
when they retire as a jury, to collectively compare the facts with 
the contents of the judge’s instruction on the law and arrive at a 
verdict.63 
According to Findlay,  
In their role of fact-finder, the jurors should understand and 
weigh up the evidence presented, assess the credibility of 
witnesses and decide on the likelihood of certain events having 
occurred in the light of the jurors’ personal experiences.64 
2.40 Thus it can be seen that, as opposed to witnesses, defendants or 
complainants who typically report, or listen to, versions of events, a 
juror has to make critical decisions based on the understanding and 
interpretation of information received. Therefore their information 
access needs are different. 
2.41 In a volume dedicated to discussions of language, the law and 
deaf communities,65 Mather and Mather explore the needs of deaf 
jurors in receiving information via English/ASL interpreters, and 
evaluate whether this should occur through meaningful 
                                                
61. Montalvo, 2001. 
62. Mather and Mather, 2003; Montalvo, 2001. 
63. Darbyshire, Maughan and Stewart, cited in NSWLRC, 2004, p 17. 
64. Cited in NSWLRC, 2004, p 13. 
65. Lucas, 2003. 
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interpretations or through the verbatim transmission of information. 
In effect, they revisit the point raised in Brennan and Brown’s work,66 
acknowledging that interpreters need to borrow from English in order 
to convey legal concepts, terminology, and key facts of the case so that 
jurors can sufficiently access information for deliberation purposes. To 
date, no linguistic studies have been carried out on the efficacy of 
interpreting for the purposes of a deaf juror, confirming that this 
study is pioneering a new aspect of research on courtroom interpreting 
2.42 In addition to the analysis of interpretation accuracy and the 
evaluation of the effectiveness of English to Auslan interpretations in 
conveying information to deaf jurors, this study also focuses on juror 
comprehension. Very few studies have explored the actual 
comprehension of signed language interpretations generally,67 let 
alone in court. Therefore key questions to be considered include: 
 What do deaf jurors understand in court? 
 How does that compare to hearing jurors? 
 Is comprehension influenced by receiving the information 
directly or indirectly (via an interpreter)? 
JUROR AND LEGAL TEXT COMPREHENSION 
2.43 In a recent article in an Australian newspaper, there was 
discussion around the role of juries, and more importantly in relation 
to this study, whether jurors understand directions from judges:  
But there's another problem: understanding the baffling 
language of the law. The state's Senior Crown Prosecutor, Mark 
Tedeschi, QC, said he could easily understand confusion arising 
from directions given by judges to jurors before they go to reach a 
verdict … Trial judges are tightly restricted in their summing up. 
Their words are governed by a complex, interwoven set of rules 
established by appeal courts and legislation… Incomprehensible 
directions were sharply criticised in the Court of Criminal Appeal 
in South Australia when it ordered a retrial of Ronald Gordon 
Hill, who shot his wife in the forehead with a revolver … Justice 
Robin Millhouse said: "I wonder how much of a summing up the 
jury ever understands? For how long is the average juror able to 
concentrate on what the judge is saying? Not much and not for 
long, I fear. Judges may overlook that jurors are laymen who 
before their jury duty know little, if anything, of the courts 
system and even less of the law which we administer in the 
courts. Yet they are expected to grasp, at one hearing, the most 
                                                
66. Brennan and Brown, 1997. 
67. Napier and Rohan, submitted.  
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complex legal concepts! I'll bet not one juror in a hundred does 
grasp them!" The chairman of the NSW Law Reform 
Commission, James Wood, QC, a former Supreme Court judge, 
said yesterday he was very concerned that directions had become 
"unmanageable and not understandable". For example, 
Australian judges cannot do much to explain what "beyond 
reasonable doubt" means…68  
2.44 This debate demonstrates that the comprehension of deaf jurors 
may not be the only issue. Instead, we need to consider deaf jurors’ 
comprehension of courtroom proceedings in comparison to the 
comprehension of hearing jurors.  
2.45 There have been several studies of the comprehension of legal 
texts which have highlighted that even hearing people listening 
directly to spoken English can experience difficulty in comprehending 
legal texts, such as police cautions or jury instructions. For example, 
Cotterill69 found that the way that a police officer delivers a caution 
can influence its comprehensibility.  Dumas70 asserts that jurors 
experience difficulty in understanding the syntactic and semantic 
complexities of jury instructions, and that any misunderstanding can 
be minimized through the use of standardized jury pattern 
instructions. 
2.46 The seminal study on juror comprehension was conducted by 
Charrow and Charrow,71 which tested and proved the hypothesis that 
standard jury instructions are not well understood by most jurors. 
First, they identified a series of complex linguistic constructions in 14 
standard jury instructions, which they hypothesised would be difficult 
to understand. Then they measured the comprehensibility of these 
instructions by administering a test, whereby jurors listened to these 
instructions and paraphrased their understanding of what the 
instructions meant. Charrow and Charrow then re-wrote the 
instructions, eliminating the problematic constructions, and re-tested 
the jurors. They found that the re-written instructions were better 
understood. Subsequent related studies have also confirmed that jury 
instructions fail to communicate central points of the law.72 
2.47 In a more recent study, similar to that of Charrow and Charrow, 
which focused on written rather than oral comprehension, Hansen, 
                                                
68. Dick, 2007, 16. 
69. Cotterill, 2000. 
70. Dumas, 2000. 
71. Charrow and Charrow, 1979a, 1979b. 
72. Elwork, Sales and Alfini, 1982; Luginbuhl, 1992; Steele and Thornburg, 
1988. 
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Dirksen, Kuchler, Kunz and Neumann73 combined three 
methodological steps to investigate the comprehensibility of rephrased 
syntactic structures in German court decisions. First, they analysed 
an annotated corpus of court decisions, press releases and newspaper 
reports on the decisions, in order to detect complex structures that 
distinguish court decisions from the other text types. Secondly, the 
complex structures were rephrased into two simplified versions.  
Finally, all versions were subjected to a self-paced reading 
experiment. Their findings correspond with those of Charrow and 
Charrow in suggesting that rephrasing greatly enhances the 
comprehensibility for the lay reader. 
2.48 A particularly interesting study is that of Judith Levi74, who 
conducted a linguistic evaluation of jury comprehension of instructions 
in her role as a linguistic expert witness. Levi analysed and discussed 
the language of the Illinois Pattern Instructions (IPI), which are used 
in the sentencing phase of a murder trial, in order to assess how well 
the language used in these instructions clearly communicated the 
legal concepts to the jury.  The study served as a follow up to a survey 
conducted by Zeisel75, which concluded that a consistent majority of 
jurors misunderstood central points of law concerning deliberations on 
the death penalty, resulting in an increased likelihood that the jurors 
will impose the death penalty. Levi’s linguistic analysis of the IPI also 
found: 
 a consistent theme of presumption of death at all levels of the 
text (syntax, semantics, pragmatics and discourse 
organisation);76 
 syntactical challenges, for example, use of multiple negatives, 
covert negatives, and embedded clauses; 
 semantic ambiguity, for instance, use of the words ‘you’ and ‘your 
finding’ and whether this should be interpreted as a singular or 
group reference; 
 incohesive discourse organisation, that is, confusing sequencing 
of points, discontinuity, and needless interruptions to the flow 
with unrelated information; and 
                                                
73. Hansen, Dirksen, Kuchler, Kunz and Neumann, 2006. 
74. Levi, 1993. 
75. Zeisel, 1990, cited in Levi, 1993. 
76. For example, “At one point… the judge first tells the jurors how to sentence 
the defendant to death and then how to give him a sentence that preserves 
his life—and then inexplicably restates how to sentence him to death. This 
death-life-death sequence clearly emphasizes the option of death, not only by 
repeating it twice but also by presenting it in the two most salient positions 
within a list, first and last” (Levi, 1993, 47). 
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 and pragmatic problems in that “jurors were given wholly 
insufficient information from which they had to deduce, or infer, 
a number of highly significant but regrettably obscured 
components of both federal and state law”.77 
2.49 In order to investigate deaf and hearing jurors’ comprehension of 
courtroom proceedings, it is necessary to acknowledge the intrinsic 
factors that contribute to comprehension, and consider elements 
necessary for comprehension testing. 
Comprehension testing 
2.50 In their analysis of the cognitive components of discourse 
comprehension, Graessar, Mills and Zwaan78 identify the following 
key variables and processes that contribute to the comprehension of a 
message: 
 background knowledge;  
 spreading activation of nodes in knowledge networks; 
 memory stores—short-term memory (most recent clause), 
working memory (approximately two sentences) and long-term 
memory;  
 discourse focus—analogous to a mental camera that zooms in on 
particular characters, objects, actions, events, and spatial 
regions; 
 how much the information resonates with the listener; 
 activation, inhibition, and suppression of nodes; 
 nodes activated by several information sources; 
 repetition and automaticity—familiar words are processed faster 
than unfamiliar words; 
 explanations actively sought out; and 
 goals of the receiver influence text comprehension and memory. 
2.51 Fundamentally, comprehension is influenced by a range of 
factors. Thus, any test of comprehension must be carefully designed 
and include a combination of rubric, item and response questions, and 
should assess representation of meaning (semantics, pragmatics, body 
of knowledge).79 
2.52 Factors affecting test comprehension difficulty include:80 
                                                
77. Levi, 1993, 31. 
78. Graessar, Mills and Zwaan, 1997. 
79. Graessar, Mills and Zwaan, 1997. 
80. Brindley and Slatyer, 2002; McNamara, 2000. 
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 the nature of the input: speech rate, length of passage, syntactic 
complexity, vocabulary, discourse structure, noise level, and 
accent; 
 register: propositional density and amount of redundancy; 
 the nature of the assessment task: amount of context provided, 
clarity of instructions, response format, and availability of 
question preview; 
 individual listener factors: memory, interest, and background 
knowledge, motivation; 
 amount of lexical overlap between the text and the response 
format; 
 length of text preceding the information required to respond;  
 length of required response; 
 repetition of tested information; and 
 whether responses and repetitions of information are verbatim or 
paraphrases. 
2.53 Hughes81 discusses a range of issues relating to language testing 
and raises several points that are of relevance to this study.  One issue 
is the inherent differences in modality that make the design of tests 
applicable across spoken and written texts challenging. Listeners 
cannot usually move backwards or forwards over what is being said in 
the way that they can a written text unless the spoken text is also 
somehow recorded and able to be manipulated by the reader.  
However, this places additional strain on the listener, whereas a 
reader usually can quite easily search a written text for information 
required.  In this study, Auslan users are similarly disadvantaged, as 
there is no agreed method for recording Auslan (or any other signed 
language for that matter) in written form.82  An Auslan text must 
therefore either be observed live or recorded on video for later viewing. 
2.54 A possible solution would be to utilise only written text for 
comprehension testing.  Unfortunately, although possibly highly 
fluent in Auslan, some deaf people may not have a sufficient literacy 
level in written English due to the sometimes significant educational 
disadvantage experienced by those with a hearing loss.83  The ideal is 
to develop a test which is conducted in the same language as that of 
the information text (ie, people are tested in their first language). 
                                                
81. Hughes, 1989. 
82. Johnston and Schembri, 2007. 
83. Johnston, Leigh and Foreman, 2002. 
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2.55 Hughes84 (1989) also presents a summary of the macro-skills 
involved in listening (comprehending), which include (i) listening for 
specific information; (ii) obtaining the gist of what is said; (iii) 
following directions; and (iv) following instructions.  Hughes’s85 
suggestion for preparing test items is for the researcher to listen to the 
text to be used, noting what the candidate should be able to 
understand from the text.  Hughes suggests that items (concepts) to be 
tested are chosen from parts of the text that are sufficiently far apart, 
so that a momentary break in concentration does not result in the 
candidate missing all the necessary information.  
2.56 Hughes86 also comments on response items and the challenge 
posed by multiple choice items, in that candidates have to hold the 
options in their memory as they listen to and assess the options.  
Although live presentation of material is usually closer to real life, 
this is outweighed by the benefit of uniformity in what is presented to 
the candidates if recorded. 
                                                
84. Hughes, 1989. 
85. Hughes, 1989. 
86. Hughes, 1989. 
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3.1 This research project sought to investigate deaf jurors’ access to 
courtroom proceedings via interpreting. In particular, the aims of the 
research were: 
 to investigate the accuracy of English to Auslan interpretations 
of excerpts from legal transcripts taken from real court cases; 
 to determine deaf jurors’ level of comprehension of information 
mediated via interpreters as compared with hearing jurors’ level 
of comprehension of information received directly by listening; 
and 
 to assess the ability for deaf jurors to access court proceedings 
via Auslan/English interpreters. 
3.2 The project encompassed two phases: 
 a preliminary study – an analysis of two interpretations and 
back translations of excerpts from a judge’s summation from 
English into Auslan; and 
 a comprehension study, which sought to analyse interpretation 
accuracy and test juror comprehension of excerpts from a judge’s 
summation. 
3.3 The key research questions were as follows: 
 How translatable are legal concepts from English into Auslan? 
 How accurately are legal concepts and terminology interpreted 
from English into Auslan? 
 How much do hearing jurors comprehend of a judge’s 
summation? 
 How much do deaf jurors comprehend of an interpreted judge’s 
summation? 
 Is there a significant difference between levels of comprehension 
between deaf and hearing jurors? 
 Are deaf jurors disadvantaged by relying on sign language 
interpreters to access information? 
 What are deaf and hearing jurors’ perceptions of the content of 
the judge’s summation? 
 What are deaf and hearing jurors’ perceptions of jury duties? 
 What are Auslan/English interpreters’ perceptions of 
interpreting for deaf jurors? 
 How effectively can deaf jurors access courtroom proceedings via 
sign language interpreting? 
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4.1 The first phase of the research involved testing the capacity for 
Auslan to convey legal information. The goal was to conduct an 
experimental study which would test whether Auslan/English 
interpreters can accurately interpret legal terminology from English 
into Auslan. The study was problematic, however, due to the 
conditions under which the interpretation was carried out. This led to 
the development of the more rigorous accuracy and comprehension 
study (see Section 5).  Below is a summary of the preliminary study, 
and the issues which invalidated the results.  This provides the 
context for the subsequent study. 
OVERVIEW OF PROCEDURE AND RESULTS 
4.2 The NSWLRC provided a judge’s summation which was taken 
from a real case heard in the Supreme Court of NSW, Criminal 
Division.87 Excerpts were chosen from the introductory comments88 
and parts of the text which focused on technical summations and 
comments regarding the onus of proof.89 
4.3 Two NAATI accredited Auslan/English interpreters were 
approached to participate in the study. Interpreter 1 was a native sign 
language user with more than 15 years experience of interpreting, a 
postgraduate qualification in sign language interpreting, some 
experience of court work, and considerable experience of interpreting 
in other legal settings (eg, solicitor). Interpreter 2 was a non-native 
sign language user with approximately seven years interpreting 
experience, a postgraduate qualification in sign language interpreting, 
and specialist legal interpreter training, but limited actual legal 
interpreting experience. 
4.4 The extracts of the judge’s summation text were read out by a 
researcher, and Interpreter 1 rendered an interpretation from spoken 
English into Auslan, which was recorded on video camera. Interpreter 
1 was given no preparation, other than being told that he/she was 
interpreting for a deaf juror who was a competent Auslan user and 
had reasonable competency in English. The location of the filming was 
the lounge room in the home of Interpreter 1. 
4.5 Interpreter 2 was then instructed to watch the filmed Auslan 
interpretation (without reference to the original English text) in order 
to produce a back translation of the Auslan interpretation into written 
English. The only brief provided was that the Auslan interpretation 
had been targeted at a deaf juror who was bilingual in Auslan and 
                                                
87. R v Gordon Charles McCreath. 
88. R v Gordon Charles McCreath, 1-3.5. 
89. R v Gordon Charles McCreath, 20-23 and 40-43. 
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English. No other background information or preparation material 
was provided to the second interpreter. 
4.6 Analysis of the interpretation found that Interpreter 1 had 
adopted a literal translation style, borrowing English terms into 
Auslan using mouthing and fingerspelling to reflect the formality and 
register of the legal text, and to introduce legal terminology.90  The 
Auslan interpretation presented information coherently, with distinct 
episodes (‘chunks’) representing each concept.  
4.7 Analysis of the back translation found a high level of equivalence 
for the introductory comments, and also in some of the more technical 
parts of the text. However, in terms of some of the legal terminology, 
the interpretation was not deemed to be of the level of accuracy 
required to ensure that a deaf juror could access the information 
needed to make informed decisions.  
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
4.8 Given that the preliminary study was not designed to replicate a 
courtroom situation, various issues were identified that influenced the 
outcome of the research:  
 The excerpts chosen for interpretation into Auslan were not 
linked, so it was difficult for Interpreter 1 to determine what 
came before each section in terms of introductory concepts.  
Therefore, the interpretation lacked narrative cohesion. In a real 
courtroom situation, the interpreter would be able to build the 
interpretation from the beginning to the end of the summation. 
 In a real courtroom situation, the interpreter and deaf person 
would be present throughout the trial and would have 
established the signs to be used for specific English vocabulary 
where required.  
 If the interpretation had been carried out in a courtroom, 
Interpreter 1 would have experienced other, additional 
challenges. Filming the interpretation in a lounge room provided 
an unrealistic advantage, in that the pressure on the interpreter 
of working in a formal, highly structured environment was 
removed.  This may have impacted on the quality of the 
interpretation, as there were no potential adverse ramifications 
to any misinterpretation. 
 In this preliminary study, the interpreter did not have a deaf 
‘audience’ for whom to interpret. Interpreters often rely on 
                                                
90. As discussed by Brennan and Brown, 1997; Brennan, 2001. 
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feedback from their clients (in the form of facial expression, 
nodding, etc) to gauge whether their interpretation is being 
understood, and whether they need to make any adaptations.91 
Several writers have commented on the negative impact of not 
having a deaf target audience when analysing the work of 
interpreters.92 
 In a real courtroom situation, an interpreter could refer to the 
physical surroundings to signal a witness, prosecutor, defence 
counsel, or the jury or other key concepts. 
 The interpreter usually would be allowed time for some research, 
or at least would be more familiar with the elements of the trial 
– for example, the charge, names of participants, and the facts of 
the case, from an initial briefing. 
 The judge’s summation was technical and dense and may 
therefore have posed a challenge to a hearing audience.  This 
initial level of difficulty and potential for misunderstanding has 
to be considered in assessing how much a deaf person would 
understand of a judge’s interpreted summation. 
 Interpreters typically work in teams of two when in court. In this 
study, Interpreter 1 was disadvantaged, as there was no co-
interpreter present to provide support (eg, to clarify terms, 
numbers, names or to monitor for any potential or actual 
misunderstandings). The sign language interpreting literature 
has identified that working in teams is an effective approach to 
ensuring accuracy, consistency and participation from deaf 
consumers,93 especially in challenging contexts (such as court). 
                                                
91. Brennan and Brown, 1997. 
92. Maroney and Singer, 1996; J Napier, 1998. 
93. Cokely and Hawkins, 2003; Fischer, 1993; Henley and Vale, 2005; Mitchell, 
2002; J Napier, Carmichael, and Wiltshire, in press. 
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5.1 Following on from the identified limitations in the preliminary 
study, it was decided to develop a more rigorous study focusing on 
accuracy and comprehension, with a research design that would 
account for the flaws identified in the preliminary study.  This study 
sought to investigate deaf jurors’ access to court proceedings via sign 
language interpreting, by analysing the accuracy of an interpretation 
of a different judge’s summation from English into Auslan.  This 
study, which would be conducted under more rigorous conditions, 
would test and compare deaf and hearing jurors’ comprehension of a 
judge’s summation. 
METHODOLOGY 
5.2 The study was designed to approximate a court experience. It 
was decided to test 12 ‘jurors’, six deaf and six hearing, in order to 
compare their level of understanding of a legal text. The jurors were 
briefed in an attempt to simulate their presence throughout a trial. 
They were then provided with the two excerpts from a real court case, 
and asked to respond to questions concerning the information covered 
in these excerpts.  The goal of the study was to evaluate the accuracy 
of the interpretation of legal concepts from English into Auslan, and to 
assess the participants’ level of comprehension of the information 
provided.  
Source text 
5.3 The NSWLRC selected a judge’s summation from a case that had 
been tried in the Supreme Court of NSW, Criminal Division. The 
case94 was heard between 27 October – 6 November 2003.  Rodney 
Ivan Kerr was charged with the manslaughter of William Christopher 
Harris at Redfern Station in NSW. He was also charged with affray 
and endangering the safety of a person on the railway. 
Representatives of the NSWLRC selected two excerpts on the basis 
that they incorporated sufficient legal terminology and important facts 
of the case for the purposes of this study. Excerpt 195 of the summation 
was delivered on Tuesday 4 November 2003.   Excerpt 296 of the 
summation was delivered on Thursday 6 November 2003. The full 
source text can be seen in Appendix A. 
                                                
94. R v Rodney Ivan Kerr. 
95. R v Rodney Ivan Kerr, 14-27. 
96. R v Rodney Ivan Kerr, 99-107. 
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Procedure 
Translation of English source text into Auslan 
5.4 Two interpreters were recruited to interpret the selected 
excerpts from English into Auslan for recording on video.  In order to 
approximate the level of background information interpreters would 
normally have if present throughout a real trial, both interpreters 
were provided with background materials, including a brief 
background to the case, a copy of the indictment (see Appendix B), the 
14 pages of the transcribed summation prior to the first excerpt, and 
the written directions circulated and referred to by the judge in the 
excerpts to be interpreted (see Appendix C).  These materials were 
provided two days prior to filming.   
5.5 Filming took place in a Department of Law room at Macquarie 
University which has been set up to represent aspects of a courtroom. 
5.6 Two deaf participants were also recruited to attend the filming of 
the interpretation in order to provide a live audience for the 
interpreters.  Both audience members were provided with a copy of 
the indictment and the written directions prior to filming.  
5.7 On arrival, the interpreters were given time to discuss 
interpreting strategies and suggestions for Auslan signs with each 
other. They were then given additional time to discuss and agree on 
the translations to be used for the English terms they anticipated 
would arise.  This would normally be the case in a real court situation. 
Translations were agreed for the following legal terms that were 
anticipated from the materials provided: accused, affray, assault, 
beyond reasonable doubt, Director of Public Prosecutions, guilty, jury, 
manslaughter, parole, Supreme Court, verdict and victim. 
5.8 A member of the research team with legal and court experience 
acted as the judge and provided a short warm-up reading to give 
interpreters the opportunity to become familiar with the speaker’s 
voice and pace of delivery, and the situation in general. Once filming 
commenced, the ‘judge’ read the selected Excerpt 1 as one interpreter 
carried out the interpretation simultaneously into Auslan and the 
second interpreter acted as prompt/support.  This again simulates the 
procedure that would occur normally during a trial. Both the 
interpreter and the ‘judge’ reading the source text were filmed. 
5.9 A five-minute break was provided between the two selected 
excerpts and the same procedure was then followed for the second 
excerpt.  For the purpose of minimising disruption in such a short 
exercise, the same interpreter carried out the interpretation of the 
second excerpt. During a longer interpreting situation, it would be 
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normal for the two interpreters to alternate their roles at regular 
intervals to reduce fatigue. 
5.10 On completion of the filming, the interpreters and deaf people 
participated in a debriefing separately with researchers. The 
interpreters were asked to comment on the challenges encountered, 
strategies used, perceived differences to interpreting for deaf 
witnesses, defendants or complainants, and any other general 
observations. The interpreters commented that there were some 
challenging parts of the text, especially in relation to use of legalese, 
and that the text felt repetitive. The interpreters were confident that 
they had met the needs of the deaf audience, but were conscious of the 
different strategies used to ensure that the jurors could access the 
terminology, for example, using more English mouthing and 
fingerspelling (ie, borrowing). 
5.11 The two deaf people acting as an audience for the interpretation 
were also asked to comment on anything they found difficult to 
understand, any perceived challenges in accessing courtroom 
proceedings through an interpreter, and any other general 
observations. Both commented that they felt that they had understood 
the interpretation clearly and, if serving as jurors, would have felt 
able to make an informed decision about the guilt of the defendant. 
They both expressed interest to serve as jurors if it were made 
possible. 
5.12 Given the feedback of both the interpreters and the deaf people, 
it was deemed that the source text and resulting interpretation were 
valid and appropriate to use for the comprehension testing stage of the 
research. 
Back translation and analysis of interpreted Auslan text  
5.13 The filmed Auslan interpretation of the selected excerpts from 
the judge’s summation was then back translated into written English 
by a third Auslan interpreter who was not present during filming.  
This interpreter was provided with the same background material and 
instructions provided to the other participants for the filmed 
translation task. The process of back translation was used in order to 
ensure reliability and content validity of the English to Auslan 
interpretation, and to identify any mistranslations. Back translation 
is a method commonly used for verification of translated tests between 
spoken languages,97 and between spoken and signed languages.98 The 
full back translation conducted can be seen in Appendix D.   
                                                
97. Hambleton and De Jong, 2003; Hambleton and Patsula, 1999; Stansfield, 
2003. 
  
5 Acc u racy  and  c omprehens ion  s tudy
 35
5.14 Key concepts in the original summation and an analysis of the 
interpretation were then identified, and a content analysis of the back 
translation was conducted to identify the extent to which these 
concepts were accurately conveyed. 
Recruitment of jurors 
5.15 A flyer was distributed on the university campus by the research 
team calling for expressions of interest from hearing people interested 
in participating in the study (see Appendix E). Hearing people with a 
background in law, sign language or deafness were excluded from the 
study. A similar flyer was also sent around to members of the deaf 
community in Sydney. Six deaf and six hearing people were recruited 
to watch/listen to the judge’s summation and participate in a 
comprehension test. 
Comprehension test 
5.16 Noting the need to minimise differences in testing procedure for 
deaf and hearing participants, two videos were produced for the 
comprehension stage of the project to ensure that participants would 
be tested in the same language throughout the comprehension test, 
whether that be English or Auslan.  The first video, for deaf 
participants, was signed in Auslan by a researcher and consisted of 
the following sections: 
 introduction and overall instructions; 
 warm-up text consisting of the first five minutes of the judge’s 
summation interpreted into Auslan; 
 the two excerpts from the summation interpreted into Auslan; 
 instructions on the nature of the questions that were to be asked 
and how participants were to respond; and 
 twelve questions consisting of: 
 four true/false questions; 
 four multiple choice questions; and 
 four open-ended questions.  
5.17 All questions were repeated before a response was requested. 
The full range of questions can be seen in Appendix F. 
5.18 The Auslan interpretation of the warm-up text and the two 
excerpts was presented as ‘picture in picture’, so that people would see 
the interpreter on screen, and the researcher reading the summation 
in a smaller box on screen, to provide a visual link to the reading of 
the original text. The test was then piloted with one of the deaf people 
                                                                                                                       
98. Cornes, Rohan, Napier, and Rey, 2006; Montoya et al, 2004. 
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who had been present at the original filming. This person was asked 
to comment on the clarity of the instructions and questions in Auslan, 
and any problems with watching the interpreter and judge on the 
screen at the same time. Once confirmed that the test was 
comprehensible, the actual data collection was arranged. 
5.19 The video for the six hearing participants consisted of the same 
sections as the video for deaf participants. However, the video of the 
warm-up text and the two excerpts from the summation shown to 
participants consisted only of the ‘judge’ reading the original text.  The 
video of the interpreter was not shown to hearing jurors as it was felt 
this would be distracting.  Instructions and questions for the 
comprehension component of the video were spoken to the camera by a 
researcher.  
5.20 Two days prior to the test, deaf and hearing comprehension test 
participants were sent a brief background to the case and the written 
instructions provided to interpreters.  Participants then attended the 
test venue individually and watched the relevant video and 
instructions.  All participants were also provided with a written 
version of questions after they had watched the summation.  All 
participants were filmed giving their responses (whether spoken or 
signed) to the camera.  A researcher was present during this activity 
in order to pause the video for answers as required. 
5.21 At the end of the comprehension test, all participants were also 
asked to comment on their experience and the challenges encountered.  
Deaf participants, and hearing participants with no jury experience, 
were asked about their willingness to be involved in a jury in the 
future.  Hearing participants with jury experience were asked to 
comment on how this activity compared to their past experience.  All 
answers provided were then transcribed from videotape. 
Participants 
5.22 The interpreter who carried out the simultaneous interpretation 
of the source text into Auslan was a professionally accredited 
interpreter (since 1990). Although not a native signer, she has worked 
since 1986 as an interpreter in a variety of settings, and her legal 
interpreting experience included criminal and civil matters. The 
interpreter also held tertiary qualifications, including a PhD. 
5.23 The interpreter acting as prompt to the simultaneous 
interpretation of the source text into Auslan was also a professionally 
accredited interpreter (since 1992).  Although also not a native signer, 
she has worked since 1988 as an interpreter in a variety of contexts. 
In terms of legal settings, these include mentions and short trials 
within Local, District and Supreme Courts for both criminal and civil 
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matters. The interpreter also possessed both undergraduate and 
postgraduate university qualifications. 
5.24 Two deaf people attended the filming of the interpretation of the 
source text into Auslan.  One deaf person was a native signer who is 
most comfortable using Auslan and has some English skills. The other 
deaf person was a non-native signer who uses Auslan as her preferred 
method of communication, but has high literacy in English and 
considers herself to be bilingual. These two were chosen to represent 
two extremes of the deaf community, so that the interpreters would 
pitch their interpretation to meet the needs of both audience 
members. 
5.25 The interpreter who carried out the back translation of the 
interpreted text into English was a professionally accredited 
interpreter (since 1990). Although not a native Auslan user, her 
experience in legal interpreting spans court, mediation sessions, 
tribunals and hearings, police interviews, solicitor appointments, pre-
trial conferences, and dispute resolution. In addition, she has worked 
as a paralegal advocate in a previous position as the manager of a 
community service. 
5.26 The ‘jurors’ were 12 people (six deaf, six hearing) selected to 
provide a broad representation across the following variables: age, 
gender, highest educational attainment, employment category, and 
first language. 
5.27 The characteristics of the participants selected are summarised 
in Appendix G, and were chosen to reflect recommendations from the 
NSW Office of the Director for Public Prosecutions that jury selection 
should account for a representation of the community in terms of age, 
sex, ethnic origin, religious belief, marital status or economic, cultural 
or social background.99  In both the deaf and hearing sample, an 
attempt was made to include non-native users of Auslan and similarly 
non-native users of English in order to include the additional 
challenge experienced by such jurors. 
RESULTS 
5.28 The results of a linguistic analysis of the source text are set out 
below.  This includes a content analysis of the source and back 
translated texts, the results of the comprehension test, and the post-
test interviews. 
                                                
99. DPP, 2003. 
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Analysis of source text 
5.29 A linguistic analysis of the original spoken English source text 
identified key issues which may have presented challenges to the 
interpreter. These included: 
 The use of archaic expressions, for example, three in number, 
element one will occasion you no difficulty, and a country blast 
on its horn. 
 Errors in the oral reading of the written text resulting in a new 
‘source text’. In particular one example, where the phrase “the 
deliberate attack or attacks” was heard, which was a misreading 
of the phrase deliberate act or acts.100 
 Reference to other parties whose role in the trial was not 
explained and was not readily apparent from the context. For 
example, the sentence was used, “Mr Button, I think, urged Mr 
Mikulic as perhaps the most reliable”. Mr Button was the 
barrister for the defendant, and Mr Mikulic was one of the 
witnesses commenting on the distance between the defendant 
and the victim at the train station.101 Although neither party was 
relevant to the questions that were asked in the comprehension 
test, the inclusion of this information placed additional cognitive 
strain on the interpreters and the participants, who naturally 
are attempting to create links between the information they are 
being provided with. 
 Unclear use of pronouns, for example, with reference to the 
CCTV camera photographic evidence, the judge states: 
For instance, photograph number 3, by which time the train is in 
and people are getting off, you may think Mr Kerr and his group 
is getting off, photograph 3 is at 12.45 and 37 seconds, and then 
at 12.46 and 5 seconds is Exhibit E, the one with his hands on 
the platform, a split second before the train hit him. 
In the final clause, the pronouns ‘his’ and ‘him’ do not refer to the 
defendant Mr Kerr, but in fact to the victim Mr Christopher.102 
 Clear examples of legalese, for example, the use of the term 
reasonable and proportionate. As the judge says himself: 
It is not suggested that there is any distinction between those 
two words, reasonable or proportionate. They are embodying 
                                                
100. See Appendix A, [S15]. 
101. See Appendix A, [S18]. 
102. See Appendix A, [S19]. 
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essentially the same concept which is a concept of 
reasonableness.103 
Yet both terms are used throughout the text. This forces the 
interpreter to either reduce both terms to one Auslan sign or to use 
two Auslan signs that convey exactly the same meaning, but in a 
different form in order to match the form of the English text.  
Analysis of interpretation 
5.30 An analysis of the English to Auslan interpretation yielded 
unsurprising results. As per Brennan and Brown’s study of 
BSL/English interpreters,104 the interpreter was found to use a literal 
translation style – using mouthing and/or fingerspelling to borrow 
terms into English, especially legal concepts. An example can be seen 
in Figure 1, where the interpreter accompanies the mouthing of the 
phrase ‘grievous bodily harm’ with fingerspelling. 
Figure 1: Example of literal translation 
Original spoken English source 
5.31 Broadly, to prove murder the Crown must establish two things. 
The first is that the death of the victim was caused by the acts of the 
accused, and the second is they must prove that in carrying out these 
acts the accused person had a particular state of mind, that is, he 
intended to kill the victim or he intended to cause that victim very 
serious bodily injury, what is called by the lawyers grievous bodily 
harm. 
Auslan interpretation 
    For       prove        murder          solicitor          must         prove          two things         
first         that       . 
FOR PROVE MURDER SOLICITOR MUST PROVE TWO ONE-TWO 
FIRST PRO-1 
    person        die         happen    because of that      accused person       his behaviour      
second         . 
PERSON DIE HAPPEN WHY PRO-2 PERSON THEIR 
BEHAVIOUR// SECOND  
    
                                                
103. See Appendix A, [S58]. 
104. Brennan and Brown, 1997. 
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  Prove       what           that          person            behaviour          before         plan          
want         . 
PROVE WHAT? PRO-2 PERSON BEHAVIOUR WILFUL BEFORE 
PLAN WANT  
to kill         that        person        that            person            plan        want        kill         
him        . 
KILL PRO-1  PRO-1 WELL PRO-2 PERSON THINK PLAN YES 
WANT KILL PRO-1  
  or       want        hurt      that person     serious      bodily         harm          called         .  
OR WANT HURT PRO-1 SERIOUS BODY HARM QUOTATION-
MARKERS  
                      grievous          bodily         harm                 gbh          . 
G-R-I-E-V-O-U-S BODY H-A-R-M G-B-H WELL 
 Transcription key 
DIE – block word represents use of established Auslan sign 
H-A-R-M – represents each fingerspelled letter 
 him 
 PRO-1   
- word above line represents mouthing used to accompany sign or 
fingerspelled item 
- word below line indicates referent sign used to signify pronoun 
Content analysis of source text and back translation 
5.32 The source text was analysed to identify the key legal concepts 
presented in the summation and the extent these were accurately 
interpreted.  Eight broad legal concepts were identified in the 
summation and have been summarised as follows: 
 Defining “manslaughter”. 
 The 1st element of manslaughter. 
The 2nd element of manslaughter. 
 Test of “causation”. 
 Defining “reasonable and proportionate”. 
 Clarifying the written directions – What did the accused do?. 
 Clarifying the written directions – Did the accused’s actions give 
rise to a well-founded apprehension of physical harm? 
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 Clarifying the written directions – Was it reasonable for the 
victim to seek to escape? 
 Clarifying the written directions – Was the method of escape 
reasonable and proportionate? 
5.33 Within the above list of concepts, a number of other 
requirements were also identified which were used to assess the 
degree to which the live interpretation was accurate. A comparison of 
the broad legal concepts in the original text and the back translation 
text found that concepts 2 and 4 were translated accurately, while 
concepts 1, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 raised issues ranging in severity from a 
change in the order of explanation to more significant changes in 
meaning.  It is interesting to note that the analysis found the back 
translation of concept 4 to be superior to the original summation! This 
analysis is discussed in more detail in paragraph 6.2.  
5.34 In terms of equivalence in content, analysis showed that the 
interpretation was 87.5% accurate. This was calculated based on the 
prevalence of 72 key legal concepts in the original source text, of which 
63 were found in the back translation text. Figure 2 shows an example 
of equivalent concepts from the first paragraph of the first excerpt of 
the summation. 
Figure 2: Example of equivalent concepts 
Source text version 
Let me move from that to the first count, that of manslaughter, 
and in order to explain the elements of the charge, and what the 
Crown must prove to establish manslaughter, it may assist if I 
very briefly, and I hope I do not confuse you, say a word about 
murder and the contrast between murder and manslaughter. 
You would appreciate, of course, there is no question in this trial 
of murder. Broadly, to prove murder the Crown must establish 
two things. The first is that the death of the victim was caused by 
the acts of the accused, and the second is they must prove that in 
carrying out these acts the accused person had a particular state 
of mind, that is, he intended to kill the victim or he intended to 
cause that victim very serious bodily injury, what is called by the 
lawyers grievous bodily harm. (nine legal concepts) 
Back translation 
Now moving on, I would like to talk about the first count on the 
indictment - manslaughter. I want to explain what this count 
entails and what the Crown must prove in order for you to be 
satisfied of the accused’s guilt. Whilst I think it will be useful to 
provide you with some information, I’ll direct the jury only very 
briefly as I don’t want to confuse you. I want to clarify that 
manslaughter and murder are very different under the law. You 
of course would understand that in this trial we are not 
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discussing a charge of murder. In regard to proving murder, the 
Crown would have to prove two elements. Firstly, that a person 
died as a result of the direct actions of an accused person; but 
also that the accused had formed an intention to kill that person. 
So there is a deliberate or intentional act that has caused that 
death or has caused serious harm to the person. Causing serious 
harm to the person is known as “grievous bodily harm”. (seven 
legal concepts) 
Comprehension of source texts 
5.35 The results from the comprehension test show that both hearing 
and deaf ‘jurors’ misunderstood some concepts in the excerpts 
presented to them. Of the closed/multiple choice questions, 
approximately 10.5% of these questions were answered incorrectly by 
all participants. Similarly, some responses from both deaf and hearing 
participants were problematic for the open-ended questions. Table 1 
summarises the correct responses by participants undertaking the 
comprehension task. 
Table 1: Summary of correct responses grouped by the format of the question 
 
 Correct responses 
Questions 
Deaf participants 
(n = 6) 
Hearing participants 
(n = 6) 
TOTAL 
(n =12) 
Q1 6 6 12 
Q2 6 6 12 
Q3 6 6 12 
True/ 
false 
Q4 3 5 8 
Q5 3 5 8 
Q6 6 6 12 
Q7 6 5 11 
Multiple 
choice 
Q8 6 6 12 
Q9 6 4 10 
Q10 1 0 1 
Q11 5 6 11 
Open 
ended 
Q12 0 1 1 
TOTAL 
54/72 
75% 
56/72 
77.8% 
110/144 
76.4% 
 
5.36 It can be seen that percentage-wise, there appears to be no 
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significant difference between the number of correct responses from 
deaf and hearing participants (2.8% difference). 
5.37 It is also worth noting that of all the errors in responses to 
true/false and multiple choice questions, almost half (five of nine 
errors made) related to Question 5, a multiple choice question which 
was also the longest of all questions asked. 
5.38 A number of similarities can be seen in the responses made by 
deaf and hearing participants and in the errors seen in Questions 4, 5, 
10 and 12 in particular, suggesting that these items may have been 
challenging regardless of language used or whether the information 
was received directly or mediated through an interpreter. Table 2 
provides the different open-ended responses to Question 9 (the 
majority of which were correct), and Question 10 (the majority of 
which were incorrect). 
5.39 Interestingly, it can be seen in response to Question 9 that all 
the deaf participants answered correctly, whereas two of the hearing 
respondents’ answers were inaccurate or incomplete. For Question 10, 
the only person who answered one question correctly was a deaf 
participant. It is also interesting to note that, in Question 9, the deaf 
participants’ responses are more detailed, as compared to Question 10, 
where the hearing participants provided fuller answers. This pattern 
was reversed for Questions 11 and 12, where the hearing participants 
had a higher number of correct responses. 
Post-test interviews 
5.40 In the post-test interviews, all participants commented on the 
facts of the case being easier to follow, while the legalistic language 
and repetition resulted in the text being more difficult to comprehend. 
Figure 3 gives examples of deaf and hearing responses to the question 
“What was harder or easier to understand?” 
Figure 3: What was harder or easier to understand 
Deaf responses 
I didn’t understand what was involved in court proceedings before.  I 
was surprised about the repetition.  I understood the interpreter, yes, 
but the language used . . . that I knew I had to try to remember.  I 
understood everything the interpreter signed, that was very easy and 
clear.  She was clear about who did what, she created the context, so it 
was easy to understand who did what.  That made it easy to 
understand. The only difficulty was the legal language like ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’.  I know it’s legal language.  Words like ‘affray’.  So 
you have to remember these things.  And they get repeated, over and 
over.  A bit boring! 
What really helped me was the use of space, the explanation in 
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Auslan.  Before I arrived, I didn’t know the signs for manslaughter, for 
example, so having the interpreter explain the sign for the word 
helped me. Without that, it would have gone over my head.  What was 
more difficult was the pace.  It was fast so you didn’t have time to sit 
back and take it in.  It started easier and then got more complex. 
Hearing responses 
The easier parts were the facts because it was quite a simple scenario, 
other than when the women appeared, because there was not mention 
of them getting off the train with Mr Kerr so that was really odd.  The 
harder part was the language used in law.  And the guy was just 
reading off and there seemed to be a lot of repeating so you almost get 
lost in it.  It’s almost more understandable if you just say this is this, 
this is this. Which is probably why the fact part of it is easier for me.  
When you start to repeat things, it becomes a little muddled. 
Coming from a different [non-English speaking] cultural and language 
background I had to concentrate on it all the time, but I found the 
judge tried to explain everything very clearly, but the wordy 
explanations sometimes caused, not confusion, but made it even 
harder for me to follow what he was trying to say.  Because it was all 
written in legal expressions, if it was written in common newspaper 
language or more everyday language it might be more clearly 
understandable, but it is a legal document and, as the judge said, 
without adding or deleting any information, delivering the message 
accurately was not very easy for all parties… I could follow especially 
with the written documents, but without this I would have to focus 
more to follow what he said. 
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Table 2: Responses to Q9 and Q10 
Question 9: 
Explain what witnesses said the two women with Mr Kerr 
did. 
Question 10: 
Explain the legal rule of ‘causation’ 
Correct answer: One or both women physically restrained Mr 
Kerr. When Mr Kerr broke free they again grabbed him and 
held him back. 
Correct answer: Did the accused’s conduct cause 
the victim to die? It doesn't have to be the sole or 
effective cause but did the act or acts of the accused 
significantly or substantially contribute to the death of 
the victim. 
 
Pa
rti
cip
an
t 
Participant responses (correct shown by 9 and incorrect shown by X) 
Deaf 1 Both women tried to restrain the man, to stop him from fighting 
with the other man.  The man resisted and broke free, going for 
the other man.  Both women again tried to hold the man but he 
went for the other man. What happened after that I don’t know. 
(9) 
Sorry, I can’t give an answer. (X) 
Deaf 2 Witnesses saw the two women get off the train with Mr Kerr.  
When Mr Kerr became aggressive and approached the other 
man, the women pulled him back to stop him approaching him.  
Also, when Mr Harris escaped by jumping onto the tracks, one 
women yelled ‘look train coming’.  That’s what happened. (9) 
Causation.  Two things, A and B happen.  If A 
happens, then eventually B will happen.  If A doesn’t 
happen, maybe B would never happen.  But if A 
happens B will definitely happen. (X) 
Deaf 3 The two women tried to hold Mr Kerr, then he broke free and 
ran up to the other man.  The two women again grabbed him 
and held onto him. (9) 
What the accused made the victim do. (X) 
Deaf 4 Witnesses said that the two women tried to restrain the man 
but he broke free so they grabbed him a second time to stop 
him approaching the victim. (9) 
Sorry, I don’t know.(X) 
Deaf 5 When the man got off the train the man started to yell at him.  
The two women tried to stop him but he continued so the 
women held him but he was determined and resisted. (9) 
Causation.  The cause.  The man was yelling and 
that made the other man fearful and run away. This 
was caused by his yelling at the victim. (X) 
Deaf 6 The two women tried to help and keep the men separated, to 
hold onto the accused. (9) 
That means that the death happened because of the 
behaviour of the accused, causing the victim to die.  
There was a link. (X) 
Hearing  
1 
They went over to the victim and pinned him down. Held him 
down for a little while. (9) 
It goes back to the cause and effect.  Was what the 
accused did, it’s hard to put into words, was what the 
accused, did it cause the victim’s action . . .   what 
the accused did is the cause to the victim’s action.  
And it has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt 
that one affected the other. (X) 
Hearing  
2 
The two women got off the train with Mr Kerr and as Mr Kerr 
shouted at Mr Harris they attempted to restrain him and hold 
him back. (9) 
Causation is cause and effect.  If there is a 
consequence of an action and it can be proven that it 
is a reasonable response to the action of the 
accused, and the accused is said to have caused 
that response in the victim.  If that victim is of firm 
mind and sound judgment then that is reasonable 
cause to say that the action of the accused caused 
that response in the victim.  And it must be 
continuous. (X) 
Hearing  
3 
They tried to stop Mr Kerr. (X) It’s like cause and affect. A causes B there is 
causation there if A’s act or saying causes B, there is 
a rule of causation in that incident. (X) 
Hearing  
4 
The two women held Mr Kerr back. (9) I was listening but causation and everything else… 
Cause of something that has happened but being 
able to prove that you intended something to happen 
and you were the reason for why it happened. (X) 
Hearing  
5 
Mmmm nothing.  They didn’t do anything.  Failed!  (Laughs)  
Looking at my notes but . . . got off the train . . . yelled . . sorry. 
(X) 
Hmm.  It’s the actual cause of it?  I didn’t write it all 
down but I understood there the question of cause in 
a common sense non-technical way.  Determining 
criminal responsibility for serious criminal offences.  
That’s what I would take it as. (X) 
 
Hearing  
6 
When Mr Kerr started yelling and saying ‘what the f**k are you 
doing’ or ‘what the f**k are you looking at’, witnesses said the 
two women restrained Mr Kerr.  He escaped from their 
restraint, obviously it didn’t appear it was a very strong 
restraint, they then went to restrain him again and he allowed 
himself to remain under constraint by the two women.   (9) 
From my understanding as described here causation 
is an unbroken chain of cause and affect. If there is 
any break in that link between a particular cause and 
a particular effect, that is not legal causation.  There 
can be several links in that chain but they have to be 
unbroken and they have to be related to one another. 
(9) 
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5.41 Although the interpreters had agreed on the signs to be used 
with the deaf audience at the time of filming, there were comments 
from two of the deaf comprehension test participants about the choice 
of signs, as seen in Figure 4.   
Figure 4: Comments about choice of signs 
I think I understood things without too much difficulty.  The 
interpreter’s signing was a little unusual, for example signing DOUBT 
NOTHING. I prefer DOUBT DON’T-HAVE 
I think I needed more explanation in Auslan about some of the terms 
and their meaning.  For example, ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.  I don’t 
think the interpretation used was right - DOUBT NOTHING.  I think 
more explanation was needed.  The other thing was the sign ‘guilty’.  I 
use this sign GUILTY (small finger tapped on chest) [rather than sign 
used by interpreter which was repetition of the fingerspelled letter G].  
So a few things could have been clearer.  But otherwise I followed 
things easily, especially the description of what happened.  But the 
terms used, that was a bit harder. 
 
5.42 This is typical of the lexical sociolinguistic variation in Auslan, 
where different signs are used according to regional, dialectical and 
age differences.105 This is one of the limitations of using a pre-recorded 
video test. If the interpreter had been in a courtroom with the two 
deaf people who made these comments, obviously she would have 
discussed and agreed to use the signs that they use. Nonetheless, the 
preference for alternative signs from two deaf participants did not 
seem to impair their comprehension of the content. 
5.43 Those hearing participants who had previously served as jury 
members were asked to compare their participation in the 
comprehension test with their prior experience. This question was 
asked in order to ascertain the realism of the test, thus validating the 
credibility of the results.106 Figure 5 outlines some of their responses. 
Figure 5: Comparisons with prior juror experience (hearing participants) 
It was similar and those points the judge was explaining did happen 
in the real case I was in.  I guess it was harder here just coming into it 
in the middle and not having time to go and reflect.  I did actually 
take notes in the real case which I didn’t here today and that does 
help me to work things out in my mind a bit better.  I think if I was 
deciding the fate of someone for the next 10 years I would take notes.  
                                                
105. Johnston and Schembri, 2007. 
106. One of the hearing participants had prior experience in court, but as a 
Korean-English interpreter, not a jury member, so this was discounted. 
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Just being on your own, I know you are meant to make up your own 
mind, but in the jury room I did find there was that talk amongst 
yourselves and people who had more divergent views did come to see 
things more from the same point of view.  And going back over 
statements and photographs and exhibits. 
Yes definitely [it was an easier experience].  I suppose when you’ve 
been through the whole three or four days I was a bit over it, whereas 
I really listened to this. It was just so much clearer. 
 
5.44 Alternatively, hearing participants with no previous jury service 
were asked to comment on how confident they felt about being a juror 
after their brief experience in this study. Their responses can be seen 
in Figure 6. 
Figure 6: Thoughts about being a juror (hearing) 
Can’t say I’m looking forward to it, but if I do it, it won’t be a problem. 
It needs to be done and I’m happy to do it… It’s part of modern day 
society. This is how we’ve structured our law reforms and this is what 
you have to do, so it’s fine.  It’s not something I would choose to avoid 
doing. 
Don’t think I would ever feel confident about being a member of a jury 
because I feel like it is a lot of responsibility trying to work out what is 
what if someone is guilty of certain acts.  I guess being able to take in 
all the information, and trying to remember it.  I guess you would 
have it documented as well and I guess you would probably find it a 
bit disturbing knowing certain things but (not pleasant things) yes, I 
would do it and I would probably feel all right doing it, but it is a big 
responsibility trying to work out someone’s fate.   
This would have only taken a week say, but that would still have been 
a week of intense concentration, keeping facts straight, your notes 
together would have helped, if you’re a juror without access to notes, 
access to written material, you are just sitting there sucking it all in, 
getting the feel of the case and, when it came time to deliberate, it 
would be easy for anybody without notes to forget significant points or 
to misinterpret those points… I could participate and hopefully come 
up with the verdict.  These types of explanations are very helpful 
[referring to the written directions]. We might know the word but not 
know how to elaborate on the complete definition in law, and an 
understanding of terms and phrases. 
 
 
5.45 As deaf people cannot currently serve as jurors in NSW, we could 
not ask them to compare their experiences. However, we did ask them 
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how they would feel about being a juror, in light of this research 
participation experience. Figure 7 illustrates the comments they 
made. 
Figure 7: Thoughts about being a juror (deaf) 
I would love to be involved if I had the opportunity.  I would be 
interested to hear about what happened, the victim and other person’s 
arguments.  I think it would be a good experience.  I watch television 
and think that it would be interesting to find out what really 
happened. 
I’ve been asked to be on a jury twice, but I’ve had to say that I couldn’t 
because I am deaf.  I think it would be interesting to be involved.  I 
know it can be boring, heavy work, but I know it is the duty of the 
community to judge their peers. In this situation, I felt I could 
participate but there was one thing about the three charges:  it was 
hard for me to see, if we said not guilty to the first charge, how we 
would then decide on the remaining two charges.  That wasn’t really 
clear to me - the difference between charge 2 and 3.  I know that it 
may be because it was the middle of the case – maybe there was more 
in depth discussion that had been held about the difference between 
charges 2 and 3 or if they made a decision about not being guilty on 
the first charge then we would look more in depth at charges 2 or 3. 
Yes, because if I could, I would.  I’ve never done it before so I would 
want to. 
Yes, because we need to be equal with the hearing community.  Deaf 
people are excluded from so many things.  I got a letter asking me to 
go for jury duty and I would have loved to, but I knew that because I 
am deaf I had to sign the form and say that I couldn’t attend because I 
am deaf. I feel I want to be involved because it is right for society. 
At first no, but this experience was interesting.  I felt scared before 
that.  I didn’t want to do it, but having watched this I thought I could 
be involved.  But maybe not a murder trial – that would be 
intimidating, but something more straightforward… One thing is that 
deaf people vary in their skill and their education.  That worries me a 
bit.  We need to be careful about saying if someone is guilty or 
innocent.  They could be sent to jail for something they haven’t done. 
But then, that’s the same for hearing people. 
I think it would be interesting and I would want to be seen as equal.  
With an interpreter, I would be fine.  I don’t see any issues.  And if the 
opportunity arises in the future, I might try to take it.  
 
5.46 Although anecdotally it seems that members of the general 
public attempt to avoid jury duty, it is worthy of note that the deaf 
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people involved in this study expressed the desire to carry out their 
civic duty, and participate in the judicial system on an equal footing 
with hearing people. The final question asked of the deaf participants 
was: ‘In order to have equal access, what would you need as a deaf 
juror (other than an interpreter)?’ Their thoughts are revealed in 
Figure 8. 
Figure 8: Access needs for deaf jurors 
I think you would need an interpreter like [Interpreter name].  A 
level 2 [NAATI paraprofessional] interpreter wouldn’t be skilled 
enough.  They would need to be level 3 [NAATI professional], fluent 
and experienced in court work. Before I came here today, I was 
thinking that the juror and the interpreter would need to have a good 
relationship.  Without a good relationship, the process wouldn’t work 
so well. 
I don’t know if it is usual for jurors to have access to notes every day, 
to later consider what was said.  That would be worth having.  I don’t 
think I would need a video (of the interpreter).  I think that is all.  
Access to what the [rest of the] jury has. 
An interpreter, as you said, and papers that I could read before or 
through the trial, especially if the interpreter wasn’t clear.  That 
would be useful. 
Yes, an interpreter, but also I need to know how the court runs 
everything.  One way would be for notes that I could take home to 
read – to make sure that I understand before I go in on the first day.  
Sometimes at the start, on the first day, there is so much to 
understand, so knowing why we are there, the parties, what 
happened, that would be good to know in advance. 
First, education and an explanation of basic terminology. Second, 
basic awareness of how the court works and how we need to behave.  
For example, should we allow our emotions to be involved or be 
detached?  We need to understand how to separate out issues and 
what to set aside, like emotions.  I think it is important and that will 
build our confidence and help us to make the right decision. 
 
5.47 In sum, results show that both the deaf and hearing ‘jurors’ 
equally misunderstood some terms and concepts. Nonetheless, all the 
findings show that legal facts and concepts can be conveyed in Auslan 
effectively enough for deaf people to access court proceedings and to 
understand the content of legal texts to the same extent as hearing 
people. The results also show that deaf people are willing to serve as 
jurors, and are confident that they can access the necessary 
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information through interpreters (with extra support from written 
notes) in order to make an informed decision as a juror.
  
6. Discussion 
 
 Analysis of translation 
 Comprehension test results 
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6.1 In this section, we discuss the analysis of the translation and the 
interpretation of the comprehension test results. 
ANALYSIS OF TRANSLATION 
6.2 The purpose of analysing the translation was to assess the 
degree to which important concepts in the original summation were 
translated.  In doing so, a note of caution must be raised.  The usual 
method for such an analysis, as used here, is to conduct a back 
translation from the target language (Auslan) to the source language 
(English) in order to see the degree to which there has been any shift 
in meaning.  Although conducted by a qualified Auslan/English 
interpreter, there is still the potential for meaning to shift during the 
back translation process.  It could be argued that even the reading of 
the original English text will introduce the potential for something to 
be misread or emphasis to be altered from that originally intended by 
the author.  
6.3 A full transcript of the analysis can be seen in Appendix H. The 
legal concepts identified in the original text will now be examined. 
Key legal concept No 1 – defining “manslaughter” 
6.4 The issue of the difference between murder and manslaughter, 
in particular, the mens rea or intention to commit a crime, was 
accurately translated. However, the “reasonable person” test was not 
well translated. The summation clearly directed the jury to consider 
“the measure of responsibility being that of a reasonable person 
stepping off a train at Redfern”. The back translation stated, “You can 
however make a decision about his words, language, his behaviour”. 
Although, the use of the word “objectively” was used in the very next 
sentence, it is uncertain if the average juror would understand the 
term “objectively” without the use of the example of the reasonable 
person. This appears to be a problem with this part of the translation. 
Key legal concept No 2 – the first and second elements of 
manslaughter 
6.5 No problems were identified with the translation of the first 
element of manslaughter. However, in relation to the second element 
of manslaughter, a subtle difference was identified between the 
summation referring to acts that “caused the death” of the victim 
compared with the back translation which refers to acts that 
“contributed to the death” of the victim. An act or acts that contribute 
to someone’s death is different to an act or acts that cause someone’s 
death. The accused may have contributed to the death but his act may 
not have caused the death. 
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Key legal concept No 3 – test of “causation” 
6.6 A major problem was identified in relation to the translation of 
this concept. The summation clearly left the interpretation of the 
evidence to the jury: 
So that even if you were to find that the deceased himself, by his 
actions, contributed to his own death… 
The back translation made an assumption about the interpretation of 
the evidence: 
The deceased himself by his own conduct of getting onto the 
tracks clearly contributed to the final result of death… 
A judge never tells the jury how to interpret evidence. The jury are 
called “the tribunal of fact” because their job is to establish whether 
the facts support the charge. The judge is the “tribunal of law” and 
determines questions of law that help the jury in their job of only 
assessing admissible evidence. The back translation would indicate to 
the deaf juror that the judge has already decided this issue and 
therefore, the jury should follow suit. 
Key legal concept No 4 – defining “reasonable and proportionate” 
6.7 The back translation was found to be better, in terms of plain 
English, than the summation. A minor comment could be made that 
the summation asks the jurors to consider first if there was a threat at 
all: 
It is an objective view based upon what the deceased did in 
response to the threat made to him, if you find that there was 
such a threat. 
The back translation assumed there was a threat, although 
admittedly, the language is not conclusive. 
Key legal concept No 5 – clarifying the written directions: what did the 
accused do? 
6.8 The summation leaves the question of what the accused did to 
the jury. The judge goes close to commenting on the truth of the 
evidence, but ultimately leaves it to the jury by opining, “ I do not 
think it is in the least controversial…”, whereas the back translation 
states on this issue, “All would agree that the victim was directly 
targeted…” This important difference is the difference in leaving facts 
for the jury to determine and the judge directing the jury on accepted 
facts – accepted by him and, by implication, the jury. 
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Key legal concept No 6 – clarifying the written directions: did the 
accused’s actions give rise to a well-founded apprehension of 
physical harm? 
6.9 The order of the translation was found to be problematic. The 
following sentence: 
In considering the victim’s reaction and his sense of fear, was the 
person himself the kind of person that would experience 
trepidation more than any other reasonable person? 
should have appeared towards the end of this part of the text, not mid-
way through. The sentence confuses the subjective with the objective 
test. The summation was deemed to be in the correct order. This did 
not appear to be hugely damaging because the objective test is 
clarified, but it did cause some degree of confusion. 
Key legal concept No 7 – clarifying the written directions: was it 
reasonable for the victim to seek to escape? 
6.10 The back translation used the word “causally”, which was 
assessed to be incorrect.  This was not thought to be hugely damaging, 
but confusing, as the issue of well-founded apprehension or fear is not 
determinative alone of the issue of causation – it merely contributes to 
the issue of the presence of causation. Otherwise, there appear to be 
no other problems with the translation. 
Key legal concept No 8 – clarifying the written directions: was the 
method of escape reasonable and proportionate? 
6.11 A reference to the victim escaping because of a “weakness in 
character” was deemed to be an incorrect insertion, as it was not 
mentioned in the original summation. This is an objective test, not an 
assessment of the victim’s character as to whether it was reasonable 
to escape the threat posed by the accused. Otherwise, no other 
problems were evident. 
6.12 From the analysis of the back translation, it can be seen that 
there were some problems with translations of the broad legal 
concepts central to the case. Yet, the problems were largely subtle 
shifts between legal definitions or objectively presented facts, to 
interpretations of the meaning of such statements. As stated in 
paragraph 5.28, the overall accuracy of the interpretation was 87.5%, 
which is relatively high. Given that candidates who sit the NAATI 
Interpreter Level test are required to achieve a pass mark of 70% for 
successful accreditation and to be considered safe to practice, 87.5% 
accuracy is more than acceptable. 
  
6 Disc uss ion
 55
COMPREHENSION TEST RESULTS 
6.13 An overall pattern that can be seen in the responses to the 
comprehension test is the difference between responses to questions of 
fact and questions relating to legal concepts.  Overall, most 
respondents answered questions of fact correctly.  In the case of deaf 
respondents, this means that the facts of the case had been 
interpreted clearly and correctly and had been understood.  When 
asked to comment on the comprehension test, four participants 
specifically mentioned the facts of the case as being one of the easier 
aspects of the activity. 
6.14 When factual errors did arise, they sometimes arose in 
respondents who otherwise provided correct answers to more complex 
questions.  An example of this can be seen in Question 9.  All the deaf 
respondents provided correct answers as to the accused being 
physically restrained by the women, while only four of the hearing 
respondents provided a correct answer. One hearing respondent 
answered the question correctly but drew a conclusion as to the 
intentions of the accused to free himself from the grasp of the women.  
First, this response was not called for by the activity but offered up by 
the respondent and, secondly, it is inconclusive in terms of the 
accuracy of the conclusion drawn. One hearing respondent failed to 
answer the question and guessed incorrectly, yet this respondent had 
previously answered all of the questions about the legal concepts and 
the factual matrix correctly.  
6.15 A similar pattern can be found with Question 11, where one deaf 
respondent answered with: 
I can’t remember what actual words he used but I remember he 
yelled. What he actually said I missed. 
This was an interesting response given the colourful language used by 
the accused and recounted accurately by the judge in his 
summation.107  Further, given that 11 other respondents recounted the 
wording almost verbatim, it is odd that one respondent missed it 
completely. It is unlikely that modesty is the reason for this 
respondent missing the words as the words can be changed when 
recounted so that they are not so offensive. 
6.16 A possible explanation for this observation is that the facts of the 
case were sparsely distributed in the body of the text, often arising 
incidentally within a discussion about a legal concept.  These facts 
were also rarely repeated during the excerpts selected for this study, 
                                                
107. See Appendix A [S18]. 
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therefore making them easier to miss.  This suggests that in an actual 
trial, where evidence is presented over a longer period of time and in a 
more systematic manner, these comprehension errors may decrease as 
jurors would have time to absorb evidence and arguments before 
hearing a judge’s summation. 
6.17 Discussion will now turn to responses to questions where a 
pattern of misunderstanding may be found.  As already suggested in 
paragraph 5.28 - 5.57, the answers to Questions 4, 5, 10 and 12 were 
problematic, and focus on the legal concepts raised in the summation.   
6.18 Five out of six hearing respondents answered Question 4 
correctly, with one additional respondent giving the correct answer, 
but being confused by the reference to murder, stating that the 
summation had been addressing the issue of manslaughter.  Only 
three out of the six deaf respondents answered this question correctly, 
however, with one of the respondents who answered correctly 
admitting that he or she did not understand the interpretation of the 
phrase “beyond reasonable doubt”.  When the researcher simplified 
this to “without doubt”, the respondent confirmed the correct answer. 
Overall, this may indicate a low level understanding of a basic 
threshold concept in criminal trials. If respondents cannot grasp this 
basic threshold concept, then the rest of the evidence may well be lost 
or misinterpreted by the jury, whether hearing or deaf, in the jury 
room. However, the level of misunderstanding is comparable between 
the two sample groups, meaning that the concept or the form of the 
question was difficult for both groups.  This issue will be discussed 
further below. 
6.19 Turning to responses to Question 5, only one of the hearing 
respondents answered this question incorrectly, compared to three of 
the deaf respondents. This response is a concern, as this question is a 
threshold question that distinguishes between the two elements of 
murder, that is, the mens rea (the intention to kill), and the actus reus 
(the act of killing). The prosecution has the burden of proof to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intended to kill the victim 
and did kill the victim. If deaf jurors have difficulty understanding the 
difference between the act and the intention to kill, and that lack of 
understanding is allowed ultimately to determine the outcome of the 
case in the mind of that juror, then unsafe verdicts are possible.  
6.20 It should also be noted that Question 5 was also the longest of 
the questions asked of the participants. This raises the challenge of 
modality in the design of comprehension materials.108  In this study, 
this becomes an issue not only for participants responding to complex 
                                                
108. Hughes, 1989. 
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verbal information, but also signed multiple choice items which must 
also be held in memory as the participant assesses the question, the 
options and his or her recollections. 
6.21 Questions 10 and 12 resulted in the highest number of errors. 
All hearing respondents answered Question 10 incorrectly. Most were 
close to the correct answer, but none of the hearing respondents stated 
the rule correctly. Whether this is fatal to their ultimate 
understanding of the concept and would lead to unsafe acquittal or 
conviction is hard to tell. The following elements of their responses 
show how close the responses were to the correct answer: 
 “was what the accused did cause the victim’s action”; 
 “the accused is said to have caused the response in the victim”; 
 “if A’s act or saying causes B”; 
 “cause of something happening”; 
 “it’s the actual cause of it”; and 
 “an unbroken chain of cause and effect”. 
6.22 In a result that is arguably better than the hearing respondents, 
one deaf respondent correctly answered the question. This respondent 
stated: 
the death happened because of the behaviour of the accused, 
causing the victim to die. There was a link.  
While this response is not perfect in relation to the events establishing 
an unbroken chain of events, it is the best and most accurate response 
from the entire sample.  The other five deaf respondents made the 
following responses in part: 
 “sorry I can’t give an answer”; 
 “if A happens, then eventually B will happen”; 
 “what the accused caused the victim to do”; 
 “sorry I don’t know”; and 
 “the man was yelling and that made the other man fearful and 
run away”. 
6.23 Turning to Question 12, only one hearing respondent gave a 
correct account of the “reasonable and proportionate response”. Three 
respondents correctly pointed out that the victim’s response needed to 
be reasonable compared to the risk posed by the accused for causation 
to be made out. The remaining two hearing respondents totally missed 
the point and answered the question by talking about irrelevant facts.  
6.24 All of the deaf respondents answered the question incorrectly. 
The closest deaf respondent stated, “we need to think about what is 
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fair and proportionate”. The respondent in question did not go on to 
explain what he or she meant by “fair” and “proportionate”. We may 
assume that “proportionate” meant whether the victim’s response was 
proportionate to the threat by the accused. However, “fair” probably 
does not mean invoking the objective test. It is too easy for a 
respondent not to understand the difference between the subjective 
test (“fair” as judged by the victim’s demeanour and “fair” as judged by 
the reasonable person). It is the lack of adequate explanation that 
makes even this response an incorrect answer. Only two of the deaf 
respondents raised the element of reasonableness. The other three 
deaf respondents totally missed the point and talked about the facts, 
as did the two above-mentioned hearing respondents. 
6.25 Again, this is a complex legal concept that is difficult to grasp, 
but an important concept that effectively proves the causation issue so 
central to a successful manslaughter conviction. The high level of 
misunderstanding by both hearing and deaf respondents is a concern.  
Referring to the comments made by participants at the end of the 
comprehension test may provide some further illumination of the 
above results.   
6.26 When asked what they found difficult about the activity, six 
respondents (four hearing, two deaf) responded with reference to the 
legal language used, the ‘wordy’ explanation, or the apparent 
repetition within the excerpts used in the study, for example, “there 
seemed to be a lot of repeating so you almost get lost in it”. This 
suggests a level of fatigue may have played a part during the viewing 
of the selected excerpts.  One deaf participant noted: 
the judge repeated things. I know they have to cover themselves 
and not show any bias but still… repeating what I already knew, 
saying the same thing from so many different angles… 
Similarly, another deaf participant noted that: 
the only difficulty was the legal language like ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’.  I know it’s legal language. Words like ‘affray’.  So you 
have to remember these things. And they get repeated, over and 
over. 
6.27 While most deaf participants commented on the clarity of the 
interpretation (“I understood everything the interpreter signed, that 
was very easy and clear”), the interpretation of some legal concepts 
was questioned.  This included the interpretation of ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’, which two deaf participants suggested could have 
been signed differently, and the sign used for the concept ‘guilty’. As 
already mentioned, in a real interpreting situation, deaf jurors and 
interpreters would have the opportunity to develop specialised 
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vocabulary and rapport over the course of the trial. One deaf 
participant, however, commented positively on the interpretation of 
‘manslaughter’. 
6.28 When asked if they would be interested in being involved in a 
jury after the experience gained in this study, all deaf participants 
responded positively while noting the negatives.  Three participants 
added that they saw jury participation as the responsibility of all 
citizens and that deaf people should not be treated any differently: 
I know it can be boring, heavy work but I know it is the duty of 
the community to judge their peers. 
6.29 Although not probed extensively in this study, deaf participants 
noted the need for Auslan/English interpreters qualified at NAATI 
Interpreter level that are “fluent and experienced in court work”.  Deaf 
participants also noted the need to have any written material provided 
in advance or notes and/or a video of the interpreter that they could 
refer to at the end of the day for reflection and review.  This raises the 
additional challenge that deaf participants would face in taking 
personal notes while watching an interpreter.  One hearing 
participant also commented on this additional challenge and the 
benefit that he gained from having notes to review and reflect on. 
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CONCLUSION 
7.1 In this study, efforts were made to improve upon the initial 
preliminary study and create as realistic a scenario as possible.  The 
information was provided to participants prior to undertaking the 
various stages of the study.  However, the source text was still de-
contextualised from an actual court case and participants were 
deprived of the gradual introduction of material that would have 
occurred in a real-life case. The material was also challenging, as 
hearing ‘jurors’ equally misunderstood some aspects of the 
summation, even though they were receiving the information directly 
in English. In a real-life courtroom, jurors would have had time to 
absorb evidence and arguments before hearing the judge’s summation. 
Even with these limitations, this study has demonstrated that: 
 legal facts and concepts can be translated into Auslan; 
 Auslan interpreting can provide effective access to court 
proceedings for a deaf juror – but certain conditions are 
necessary; 
 hearing people misunderstand court proceedings without being 
disadvantaged by hearing loss; and 
 deaf people are willing and able to serve as jurors.  
7.2 As there is evidence to suggest that deaf people are not 
disadvantaged by having to rely on sign language interpreters to 
access information in court, and that they seem to understand just as 
much content as their hearing counterparts, there is a strong 
argument in favour of allowing deaf people to serve as jury members. 
Our responses to the research questions posed in paragraph 3.1 are 
set out below: 
 Legal concepts are translatable from English into Auslan, but 
interpreters need to be adequately skilled so as not to skew the 
legal definitions or to bias the text with subtle shifts in 
interpretation. 
 In this study, we found that the legal concepts and terminology 
present in the original judge’s summation were interpreted from 
English into Auslan with 87.5% accuracy. 
 Hearing jurors in this study answered almost 78% of the 
comprehension test questions correctly, implying a relatively 
high level of comprehension of the judge’s summation. 
 Deaf jurors in this study answered 75% of the comprehension 
test questions correctly, implying a relatively high level of 
comprehension of the judge’s summation. 
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 For the participants in this study there was no significant 
difference between levels of comprehension of the deaf and 
hearing jurors. 
 Relying on sign language interpreters to access information in 
court does not disadvantage deaf jurors. 
 Deaf and hearing jurors similarly perceived the content of the 
judge’s summation to be complex and repetitive. 
 Deaf and hearing jurors regarded jury service as a necessary 
civic duty. The deaf jurors all expressed interest in serving as 
jurors if they were afforded the opportunity. 
 The Auslan/English interpreters in this study did note a 
difference in interpreting for deaf jurors (as compared to deaf 
witnesses, defendants, etc), but felt confident that they could 
adequately service their information needs.  
 The findings of this pilot study suggest that deaf jurors can 
effectively access courtroom proceedings via sign language 
interpreting. 
IMPLICATIONS OF THIS REPORT 
7.3 The findings of this project contributed to the work of the 
NSWLRC. It is envisaged that the conclusions of this report will also 
influence considerations for law reform in other States and Territories 
in Australia. The findings will also have national and international 
impact by revealing the extent to which deaf people can access 
courtroom proceedings and make a contribution to a jury, by 
demonstrating that they are not disadvantaged in doing so by using 
interpreters. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 As a consequence of the findings of the study and our 
conclusions, we make the following recommendations. 
 That deaf people be permitted to serve as jurors in criminal cases 
in NSW, with access provided through a team of interpreters, 
and additional support through the provision of written 
documents (in advance) and access to a transcript at the end of 
each trial day. 
 That deaf people serving as jurors must have reasonable 
competence in English (as does any juror), in order to understand 
English legal terms when they are borrowed into Auslan by 
interpreters, and to understand any written materials. 
 Interpreters should receive specific legal training on how to 
interpret for deaf people in different roles in court. 
 Only experienced legal interpreters should work with deaf jurors 
and they should be qualified at NAATI Interpreter level, as is 
current practice. 
 That deaf jurors and interpreters be allowed time to brief and 
debrief at the beginning and end of each day during trial, in 
order to check for such matters as understanding and agreement 
of signs. 
 A predictive screening test for court interpreters of all languages 
be developed as per the United States Federal Court Interpreter 
Certification Examination (FCICE),109 which requires that 
interpreters in US Federal Courts be certified through a 
criterion-referenced performance test. The FCICE is a two-phase 
certification battery for Federal Court interpreters. Phase I is a 
multiple-choice Written Examination (WE) used to screen 
candidates for eligibility to take the Phase II criterion-referenced 
Oral Examination (OE), and thus filter out interpreters who do 
not have adequate skills to interpret in court.110 This would be 
particularly important for Auslan/English interpreters working 
with deaf jurors. 
8.2 This research can only be considered as a pilot due to the small 
number of participants. Furthermore, this study has demonstrated 
that a small number of deaf people can understand excerpts from a 
judge’s summation through English to Auslan interpretation, and that 
they are willing to participate in the judicial system as jurors. It does 
                                                
109. Enacted by the Court Interpreters Act (28 U.S.C. §1827), US Congress, 1978. 
110. Stansfield and Hewitt, 2005. 
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not, however, provide evidence for how deaf people can participate in, 
and make a significant contribution to, jury deliberations. Neither 
does it explore the potential impact of deaf jurors on the 
administration of justice from the perspective of the advocates, the 
bench, the accused and witnesses. Further research is needed to 
investigate deaf juror participation in court proceedings. 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
8.3 We make the following suggestions for further research: 
 Administration of the comprehension test on a larger scale to 
deaf and hearing people throughout Australia, in order to collect 
data with statistical significance. This will feed into further law 
reform developments and the issue of comprehension of judges’ 
directions, as discussed in Dick.111 
 Following on from Berk-Seligson’s112 and Russell’s113 research in 
the US and Canada respectively, conduct a mock trial over 
several days, filming the proceedings and jury deliberations and 
sentencing; and conduct interviews, comprehension tests and 
discourse analyses of all participant utterances. 
 Following on from Brennan and Brown’s114 (1997) research in the 
UK, when deaf people are permitted to serve as jurors, carry out 
courtroom observations of real deaf juror experiences wherever 
possible (and if allowed). 
 A collaborative study between the USA and Australia to compare 
comprehension and participation of jurors relying on signed and 
spoken language interpreters (ie, Spanish, ASL and Auslan). 
                                                
111. Dick, 2007. 
112. Berk-Seligson, 1990. 
113. Russell, 2002. 
114. Brennan and Brown, 1997. 
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APPENDIX A: TRANSCRIPT OF JUDGE’S SUMMATION 
JUDGE’S SUMMATION: CROWN V KERR 
Warm up (p 13-14) 
[S1] Now, let me move from that to say something about the form of 
the indictment, which in its amended form, includes three counts 
against Mr Kerr, each expressed to be in the alternative. The charges 
are set out in a particular order. That is, the most serious first, that is, 
count 1, manslaughter, the next most serious next, count 2, affray, 
and then count 3, the railway charge, which is also a serious criminal 
offence, but less serious than counts 1 and 2. You should begin by 
considering the most serious, manslaughter, and if you were to find 
Mr Kerr guilty of that offence then that would be the end of the 
matter. Your verdict would be guilty when the count of manslaughter 
is read by my associate when you return to give your verdict. There 
would be no need for you to consider counts 2 and 3. Indeed, no verdict 
would be taken from you in respect of counts 2 and 3. So you consider 
the indictment down the indictment. 
[S2] If, however, you were to find Mr Kerr not guilty of manslaughter, 
it would then be necessary for you to consider the second count of 
affray, and the same principles would apply. That is, if you found Mr 
Kerr guilty of affray when my associate read out that count, the 
second count, your verdict would be guilty. If, however, you were not 
satisfied as to that charge beyond reasonable doubt, as to the essential 
elements, it would then be necessary for you to consider count 3, the 
railway charge, and to reach a verdict in respect of that charge. You 
verdict, as I have said, must be unanimous. 
[S3] Now, the fact that there are a number of counts, some more 
serious than others, is not an invitation, you would appreciate, to 
compromise. Indeed, were you to approach the matter upon the basis 
of compromise, then you would be failing in your duty. Suppose, for 
instance, that six of you thought that Mr Kerr were guilty of the first 
count and six of you thought that he was guilty of nothing at all, not 
guilty. Then it would be quite wrong, you would appreciate, for you to 
compromise and say: Well, we will find him guilty of counts 2 or 3 
unanimously. It is not a question of compromise. It is a question of you 
unanimously being satisfied, if you are, that the Crown has proved its 
case and, if not, then that you believe the accused is not guilty, 
because the Crown has failed to satisfy you beyond reasonable doubt 
in respect of that case. 
Excerpt 1: Tuesday 4 November 2003 (p 14-27) 
[S4] Let me move from that to the first count in the indictment, that of 
manslaughter, and in order to explain the elements of the charge, and 
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what the Crown must prove to establish manslaughter, it may assist if 
I very briefly, and I hope I do not confuse you, say a word about 
murder and the contrast between murder and manslaughter. You 
would appreciate, of course, there is no question in this trial of 
murder. 
[S5] Broadly, to prove murder the Crown must establish two things. 
The first is that the death of the victim was caused by the acts of the 
accused, and the second is they must prove that in carrying out those 
acts the accused person had a particular state of mind, that is, he 
intended to kill the victim or he intended to cause that victim very 
serious bodily injury, what is called by the lawyers grievous bodily 
harm. So that involves reaching into the mind of an accused person, 
and by reference to his words and actions, drawing inferences as to 
what he intended when he acted in a particular way that is said he 
acted, did he intend to kill the victim or did he intend to cause that 
victim very serious bodily injury, grievous bodily harm. 
[S6] Now, this is quite different to the issue that arises in 
manslaughter. Manslaughter is an unlawful killing falling short of 
murder. The criminal culpability attaching to manslaughter is less 
than murder, although it is still a very serious criminal offence. The 
difference in very broad terms is that you judge whatever are the 
actions of the accused, not according to what he intended, that is, his 
subjective state of mind, but rather his words and actions are 
examined from an objective viewpoint. The measure of responsibility 
is that of a reasonable person in his position getting off the train at 
Redfern; what such a person would have appreciated in the 
circumstances. 
[S7] I will come to the precise issues which you must address in a 
moment. At this point let me distribute the written directions which 
you will have with you in this trial which will be marked for 
identification 10. There is a copy for each of you. 
Copies of mfi 10 handed to jury 
[S8] What I want to do is introduce you to this document, take you 
through the various pages, simply to identify what it deals with, and 
then I will return to the first page and systematically work my way 
through the document explaining various aspects of it. But you will 
see that on the first page there is a reference there to count 1, and the 
heading “Manslaughter by an Unlawful and Dangerous Act”. You will 
see the three matters 1, 2, 3 that the Crown must prove beyond 
reasonable doubt. In fact there are four matters because the third 
matter you will see in fact involves two sub-elements. So there are 
four matters, and I will return to each of these concepts in a moment. 
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[S9] If you pass over to the second page, you will see there is a heading 
“Notes re Manslaughter by an Unlawful and Dangerous Act” and then 
there is a phrase “did cause the death”. That is a phrase which is 
taken from the words in the indictment for count 1. So you will see, if 
you pass to the next page, that is, page 3, that there is a reference 
there to “unlawful act” and “dangerous act” and various definitions are 
given. So this is like a glossary of terms and I will come back to each 
aspect in a moment. 
[S10] If you pass then to the fourth page you will see that it is headed 
“Alternative (Count 2): Affray”, and it deals with the second charge 
brought by the Crown against Mr Kerr in the alternative which has 
been referred to as affray, count 2, and the elements of that charge are 
there set out, three in number. 
[S11] If you turn the page to page 5 you will see the heading “Further 
Alternative (Count 3): Railway Charge”, and again the format is the 
same. It sets out the elements of the railway charge and what the 
Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt. 
[S12] So they are the written directions. Let me return to the first 
page where you will see the elements of the first count which the 
Crown brings against Mr Kerr, that is, the count of manslaughter by 
an unlawful and dangerous act. Let me draw your attention at once to 
the introductory words that appear at the very top of that box because 
they are important. You will see these words: “Before you can convict 
the accused of manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act, you 
must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt”. 
[S13] That is simply a reminder, first that it is the Crown that has the 
onus or the burden of proof. It brings the charges. It must prove them. 
Then the other matter it reminds you of is the standard of proof, the 
very heavy standard, that is, beyond reasonable doubt. 
[S14] Let me go to the elements, and you will see that the first 
element is “that William Christopher Harris died”. There is, of course, 
no issue that Mr Harris died at the Redfern railway station at 
12.49pm on 27 October 2002, having received multiple injuries after 
having been struck by a train. Indeed, that is an agreed fact in 
exhibit O, I think it is the first agreed fact. So clearly element 1 will 
occasion you no difficulty. 
[S15] Let me move at once to element 2. You will see it there: “2: That 
his death was caused by the deliberate attack or attacks of the 
accused”, and deliberate in this context simply means voluntarily or 
willed as opposed to something that may happen by mistake or 
accident or something that is a reflex action, something that is not 
willed. It is not being suggested by Mr Button on behalf of Mr Kerr 
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that the actions of his client were not deliberate in that sense, but it is 
a matter in respect of which you must be satisfied beyond reasonable 
doubt. 
[S16] Now, this second element, I should say, really involves two 
questions, and indeed, both questions are important, you may think 
fundamental, to this trial. The first concerns the actions of Mr Kerr. 
Exactly what did he do or say? What were his acts? And the second 
issue is concerned with causation. Whatever Mr Kerr may have said 
or done, can it be said that that caused the death of William 
Christopher Harris? 
[S17] In respect of the first issue, that is, the factual issue, what Mr 
Kerr did, I will later in this summing up remind you very briefly of 
what various witnesses have said, and of course you have the video 
and the photographic record in exhibit B of the surveillance camera on 
Redfern station at that time. You may think, having heard the 
addresses of counsel, that there really is not very much dispute at all 
as to what actually happened, and that the areas of dispute on the 
facts really are very limited. 
[S18] I will go to the detail later, but the following appears to be more 
or less common ground. That is, that Mr Harris and the accused were 
perfect strangers to each other; that Mr Harris was sitting at the end 
of platform 7, that is, on the last seat, not at the very end of the 
platform, you have exhibit A, waiting for his train which was due to 
come in on platform 6; that a train arrived on platform 7 and Mr Kerr 
got off somewhere near the deceased. There is some controversy about 
where precisely that was, but somewhere in that general locale. That 
the accused then addressed Mr Harris saying, and probably repeating, 
words such as, “What the fuck are you looking at”, or “What the fuck 
are you staring at”, and that he then approached Mr Harris and was 
physically restrained by one or other or both women, and that he at 
some stage broke free or to some extent escaped from these women to 
be grabbed again and there were a number of lurching type actions 
which you can see on the video. That, according to all but one witness, 
there was no physical contact between the deceased and the accused. 
The Crown said to you that it is not part of the Crown case that there 
was physical contact. That the distance which separated these two or 
the groups was put by some witnesses as two metres, others as 10 and 
others somewhere in between. Mr Button, I think, urged Mr Mikulic 
as perhaps the most reliable, who put it between four and eight. Mr 
Harris did not respond in any way or say anything. Rather he simply 
got up, moved to his right, circled, as it were, the seat, headed at a 
reasonable pace towards the edge of the platform and then jumped on 
to the track. 
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[S19] There are some differences between witnesses as to how he got 
down, but he apparently looked up towards the north, towards the 
city, the direction from which he was expecting his own train. There 
are differences as to what precisely he then did, which way he was 
facing at various times, whether at some stage he was facing towards 
the group, including the accused, on platform 6 and 7. That, at some 
point, whilst he is on the tracks, the woman on the platform yelled out 
“train”, they having seen the train approaching on the track leading to 
platform 5, and I think it is common ground that shortly after they 
yelled out the train gave a blast, a country blast on its horn, and at 
this point the suggestion is that Mr Harris quickened his pace and 
that brought him into the path of the train, that he endeavoured to get 
on to the platform and to some degree was able physically to make 
contact with that platform, as shown in those photographs, exhibit F, 
from memory, but ultimately then came into contact with the train 
and was killed. That this entire episode on any view happened very 
quickly, and you can calculate the time by looking at the times 
recorded on those successive stills that are taken from the video 
footage. For instance, photograph number 3, by which time the train is 
in and people are getting off, you may think Mr Kerr and his group is 
getting off, photograph 3 is at 12.45 and 37 seconds, and then at 12.46 
and 5 seconds is Exhibit E, the one with his hands on the platform, a 
split second before the train hit him. That, on my calculations, but do 
not trust my mathematics, is roughly about 28 seconds about half a 
minute. 
[S20] You will recognise broadly that that is the context within which 
the first issue must be determined, that is, the factual issue, what is it 
exactly that Mr Kerr did, what were the words and actions that can be 
attributed to him, as to which you are satisfied. 
[S21] Now, let me say something about the second issue, which is also 
an important, indeed a fundamental, issue in this trial arising from 
within element 2, and that is the question of causation. Now, the 
concept of cause and effect is something with which you are all 
familiar. In our everyday lives one examines events in order to 
understand why they occur. Did one event lead to another? Can it be 
said that one event caused the other? Is one event the effect of some 
cause or causes? The surrounding circumstances are examined to 
determine whether the end result can be attributed to a particular 
cause. 
[S22] The approach of the law is no different. Sometimes lawyers refer 
to the chain of causation when one event can be linked to another, as 
in a chain, cause and effect. Here you are required to apply your 
common sense to the conjunction of events and determine whether one 
thing caused another, bearing in mind, of course, that you are 
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attributing legal responsibility in a criminal matter, so your inquiry is 
plainly a serious matter and caution is called for. 
[S23] Now, issues of causation, I might say, although not causation 
leading to death, also arise in the context of the other alternative 
charges, that is, counts 2 and 3, and I will deal with those charges 
later. But simply to illustrate that they do involve questions of 
causation, if you perhaps turn to the second count, affray, page 4 in 
the written directions, and if you look at element 3 you will see “that 
the acts and words of the accused were such as would cause a person 
of reasonable firmness”, so there are questions of causation, so again 
you will be required to consider issues of cause and effect and you will 
approach those in the same non-technical common sense way, but 
bearing in mind that you are attributing legal responsibility in a 
criminal matter. 
[S24] Similarly on page 5, the third charge, the railway charge, you 
will see element 3 includes the words, “that the accused thereby 
endangered”, so again it is these acts that are said to have thereby 
endangered, to have caused this effect, and you will be obliged to 
consider that issue in the context of those directions. 
[S25] But returning to count one, that is the count dealing with 
manslaughter, an event may have a number of causes. The Crown is 
not obliged to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the conduct of the 
accused was the only cause leading to death; for instance, the action of 
the train was plainly one of the causes and indeed the immediate 
cause of death. So what does “cause” mean in this context? The test is 
whether or not the act or the acts of the accused significantly or 
substantially contributed to the death of the deceased. So that even if 
you were to find that the deceased himself, by his actions, contributed 
to his own death, it would not follow that the accused cannot be 
convicted. The question in that circumstance would be, 
notwithstanding the contribution to his own death made by the 
deceased himself: Can it be said that the Crown has established to 
your satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt that the conduct of the 
accused significantly or substantially contributed to the death of the 
deceased? 
[S26] Now, in some cases of manslaughter, the issue of causation is 
straightforward; someone punches someone, someone falls over, they 
crack their head, and they die. There are not the same complexities 
that arise in the context of this case. Here the issue of causation is 
more complicated because it involves the reaction of Mr Harris to the 
conduct of the accused. Where the conduct of an accused induces in 
the victim a well-founded apprehension of physical harm, such that it 
is reasonable for the victim to seek to escape, then the fact that death 
occurs in the course of that escape does not break the chain of 
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causation, provided that the Crown satisfies you beyond reasonable 
doubt that the response of the victim, in this case the deceased, was 
reasonable or proportionate, having regard to the nature of the 
conduct of the accused and the fear that that is likely to have 
provoked. 
[S27] So that requires you to address a number of issues. First, what 
was this conduct of the accused? What did he do or say? Second, did it 
induce in Mr Harris a well-founded apprehension of physical harm 
such that it was reasonable for him to escape? So that is an objective 
inquiry. Looking at the actions objectively. Third, if so, was the 
response of Mr Harris reasonable or proportionate having regard to 
the conduct of the accused and the fear it is likely to have provoked? 
[S28] In determining whether the response of the deceased was 
reasonable or proportionate, you should take into account all the 
circumstances, including the speed with which events unfolded, the 
way in which a person fearful for their own safety, and forced to react 
on the spur of the moment, may react. In other words, it is not an 
armchair inquiry with all the wisdom of hindsight and no limits as to 
time. You should have regard to the pressure of events as they unfold. 
[S29] It is for the Crown to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the 
acts of Mr Kerr caused the death of Mr Harris. The Crown must 
therefore satisfy you beyond reasonable doubt that the response of Mr 
Harris was in the circumstances reasonable and proportionate, having 
regard to the nature of the conduct of the accused and the fear that is 
likely to have provoked. If you are not satisfied, then you must acquit 
the accused of the charge of manslaughter. 
[S30] When I use the phrase “reasonable or proportionate”, I am not 
seeking to draw a distinction between those two words. That is simply 
the formula that is traditionally used, but it embodies essentially the 
one concept; that is, the concept of reasonableness. It is an objective 
test. It is looking at the flow of events, the conduct of Mr Kerr, the 
response of Mr Harris, and asking is the latter a reasonable and 
proportionate response to the former such that the former can be said 
to be a cause. If it was not reasonable or proportionate, then there was 
a break in the chain of causation. 
[S31] So that you can see from the statement that the issue does not 
depend upon Mr Kerr’s view as to what he thought Mr Harris might 
do. It is an objective view; not does it depend upon the character of the 
deceased. It is an objective view based upon what the deceased did in 
response to the threat made to him, if you find that there was such a 
threat.  
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[S32] The character of the accused, as to which there has been a deal 
of evidence, is not relevant to that issue; that is, the issue of whether 
the response was reasonable or proportionate. So you may ask: Well, 
what is the relevance of the evidence concerning the character of the 
accused? It seems to be common ground that the deceased was of a 
particular character, that is, a person who was non-confrontational. 
That evidence is relevant as to the issue of what the accused in fact 
did, what were the act or acts of the accused. 
[S33] When you are judging the accused’s behaviour towards Mr 
Harris, and exactly how bad it was, if it was bad, you may take into 
account the personality or character of the deceased, Mr Harris. Did 
Mr Harris get up and seek to escape because the conduct of the 
accused gave him a well-founded apprehension of physical harm such 
that it was reasonable for him to escape, or did he get up, not because 
the character of what the accused did was so bad, but because of his 
particular personality and his desire to avoid confrontation? So that 
that is the way in which that evidence as to the actual emotional 
character of the deceased, if you like, may be relevant. 
[S34] I suppose the physical character of the deceased may be 
relevant, that is to say the fact that he was 44, apparently able-bodied, 
to the issue of causation, that is, whether what he did was reasonable 
or proportionate, because, in determining whether what he did was 
reasonable or proportionate, then one may have regard to the physical 
character of the person. If a one-legged person endeavoured to act in a 
particular way, that may be one thing. If a person is able-bodied that 
may be another. So to that limited degree the physical attributes of 
the deceased may be relevant to that issue, but the actual character, 
in the traditional sense of that word, the non-confrontational aspect of 
his character, which appears to be common ground, that aspect really 
is only relevant to your assessment of what the accused actually did, 
in assessing that behaviour, and whether or not what Mr Harris did 
was a response to his own particular character or a response to the 
particular acts of the accused because of their intrinsic nature; that is, 
that they gave rise to a well-founded apprehension of physical harm 
such that it would be reasonable for a person in that circumstance to 
escape. 
[S35] Members of the jury, it is almost lunch and that is probably a 
reasonable moment to break, so we will resume at 2 o’clock or shortly 
after. I will send out the videos with you. 
Excerpt 2: Thursday 6 November 2003 (p 99-107) 
[S36] Good morning, members of the jury. At the end of yesterday you 
provided the note which has been marked for identification 11, and 
just to remind you of the terms of that note I will read it out to you 
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and then endeavour to provide an answer. The note really is in three 
parts, and it is in these terms, the first part as follows: “Can Your 
Honour expand on the definitions of ‘reasonable, proportionate’ in your 
directions on page 2?”. 
[S37] That is a reference, of course, to the written directions which you 
have, and the topic “Did cause of death”. The second part of the note is 
in these terms: “Do the remarks about ‘the victim’ relate to Mr Harris 
in particular or victims or persons in general?” 
[S38] And the third part of the note is: “Are the remarks about ‘a 
person fearful for his own safety’ to be considered only in terms of Mr 
Harris’s actions, or the actions of a ‘reasonable person’?” 
[S39] And there is reference to that paragraph, paragraph 5, on 
page 2. They are the three questions, and if I could take them out of 
order and postpone for the moment the answer to question one, which 
is dealing with reasonable and proportionate, and if I could turn 
rather to the second question which I will read again so you have it in 
the forefront of your minds: “Do the remarks about ‘the victim’ relate 
to Mr Harris in particular or victims or persons in general?” 
[S40] I will have my associate, just in case you do not have a copy, 
provide you with a photocopy of your own note just to remind 
yourselves of what exactly it is that you asked. 
[S41] The short answer to that question, which is directed to that 
middle paragraph of page 2 where it talks about inducing the victim 
and so on, and I will come back to it in detail in a moment, the short 
answer is that the reference in that paragraph to the accused is a 
reference to Mr Rodney Kerr, the accused; the reference to the victim 
is a reference to Mr William Christopher Harris, the deceased. 
[S42] Let me elaborate upon that answer just to make it clear what is 
meant. And what the nature of the test is that you must apply. To do 
that, I think it is beneficial if I read it again, so you have it in your 
minds, what the written directions say on the issue of causation, and I 
will just read through it. I know you have probably read through it 
half a dozen if not more times already, but on page 2 under the 
heading “Did cause death” these words appear, and you might follow 
them with me: “The Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt that 
the act or acts of the accused caused the death of the deceased. You 
should approach the question of causation in a common sense non-
technical way, appreciating that you are determining criminal 
responsibility for serious criminal offences. The test is whether the act 
or acts of the accused significantly or substantially contributed to the 
death of the deceased.” 
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[S43] There then appears the paragraph which is the subject of your 
question two: “Where the conduct of the accused induces in the victim 
a well-founded apprehension of physical harm, such that it was 
reasonable for the victim to seek to escape, then the fact that the 
death occurs in the course of that escape does not break the chain of 
causation, provided the response of the victim was reasonable or 
proportionate having regard to the nature of the conduct of the 
accused, and the fear it is likely to have provoked.” 
[S44] I think it is probably worthwhile to keep reading, but I will come 
back to that paragraph in a moment in detail. Just to have it in 
context, you will see the next paragraph is as follows: “In determining 
whether the response of the deceased is reasonable or proportionate, 
you should take account of all the circumstances, including the way in 
which a person, fearful for his own safety, and forced to react on the 
spur of the moment, may react. It is for the Crown to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that the response of the deceased was reasonable or 
proportionate having regard to the nature of the conduct of the 
accused, and the fear it is likely to have provoked. If you are not so 
satisfied, the accused must be acquitted of manslaughter. Your verdict 
would be ‘not guilty’ to count 1.” 
[S45] So they are the written directions in respect of that aspect, 
causation. Returning to that middle paragraph on page 2 which 
speaks of the victim, I should say just by way of explanation as to how 
the word “victim” came to appear in these directions, that that 
particular paragraph has been lifted from a case which has been 
decided in these courts, indeed in the High Court of Australia, which 
is the highest appellate court in this country, and that is why it is 
expressed in those terms. It has simply literally been lifted from that 
case as the comments of the particular Court in that case where they 
were laying down a general rule, a general test, to be applied in all 
cases where the issue arises, and that is why it talks about victim and 
the accused; but you should understand that that case is meant to 
apply, in the context of this case, that is, the victim allegedly being Mr 
Harris and the accused being Mr Kerr. 
[S46] Analysing that paragraph, that middle paragraph speaking of 
the victim, you will see that it gives rise to a number of separate 
issues, and I think an analysis of that paragraph might clarify the 
way in which you should go about your task. The first issue is: What 
did the accused do? What did he do or say? I do not think it is in the 
least controversial, having heard counsel’s addresses, although this is 
a comment from me, to say that whatever he did appeared on the 
evidence to be directed at Mr Harris, and Mr Harris is, in the context 
of those actions of the accused, the victim. So that is the first thing, 
you have to make up your mind as to exactly what he did. What 
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exactly was it that he said and did, and that is really the first issue, 
and that is the bedrock of whatever inquiry you make which affects 
other issues further down the track. 
[S47] The second issue is whatever he did, did it give rise to a well-
founded apprehension of physical harm? In other words, was it 
reasonable that Mr Harris should have been fearful of physical harm 
at the hands of Mr Kerr? That is an objective matter, not a subjective 
matter. Let me explain what I mean by that. It does not depend upon 
the reaction of Mr Harris, the determination of that issue. That is, 
whether personally he was in fear; rather, it is a matter for you to 
determine whether objectively a reasonable person in his position 
would have been in fear having regard to what you find were the acts 
of Mr Kerr directed at Mr Harris. 
[S48] That is not to say that Mr Harris’s reaction to whatever 
happened on the station at Redfern is irrelevant to your 
determination, but it does not conclude the matter. It is not 
determinative, it does not determine the outcome. You must stand 
back, having determined in your own mind what you believe Mr Kerr 
did or said on that platform, and say to yourself: Well, was it 
reasonable that a person confronted by that in that situation, that 
geographical situation, that end of the platform, that time of the day, 
that situation, was it reasonable that a person confronted by those 
actions, words and actions, should have been apprehensive of physical 
harm, should have had, to use the phrase which appears in that 
middle paragraph, a well-founded apprehension of physical harm. So 
that is the second issue. 
[S49] The first issue is what Mr Kerr did. The second issue is 
whatever he did. Did that give rise to a well-founded apprehension of 
fear of physical harm. Then you get to the third issue, which is a 
related issue, and it comes from the phrase which you will see in that 
paragraph “such that it was reasonable for the victim”, that is Mr 
Harris, “to seek escape”. Again, that is an objective matter, and it 
depends upon reasonableness. Was it reasonable for a person in the 
position of Mr Harris, having been confronted by that conduct, having 
felt that fear of physical harm, to seek to escape? That is the next 
issue, the third issue, being reasonableness and escaping. 
[S50] The fourth issue assumes to some extent that you answered the 
question: Well, that is what he did, that is the fear he felt, yes or no it 
was reasonable. If you felt it was not reasonable for him to want to 
escape, then that would be the end of that, but if you believed it was 
reasonable for him in that circumstance to seek to escape then you 
come to the fourth issue. This is the issue which concerns the mode of 
escape. We know the mode of escape chosen by Mr Harris was to cross 
the tracks to safety on platform 5. We know that in doing that he met 
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his death. But what the Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt is 
that the death was caused by the conduct of the accused, and what 
that paragraph in the middle which is the subject of your questions 
says, there will be a break in the chain of causation, unless the Crown 
satisfies you beyond reasonable doubt that the response of Mr Harris 
in choosing to cross the tracks to the safety of platform 5 was 
reasonable or proportionate, having regard to the conduct of the 
accused and the fear it is likely to have induced, so you are going back 
to the conduct of the accused and the fear it is likely to have induced. 
[S51] Again, that is an objective inquiry. It is a question of 
reasonableness. It is a question of your view as to whether that was 
reasonable or proportionate for him to do, he having chosen to escape. 
It is a matter for your judgment as to whether that was reasonable or 
proportionate, having regard to the conduct of the accused and the 
fear that it induced. 
[S52] In making that determination, you may have regard to the 
context in which this is all happening; that is, the circumstances in 
which it all took place, including the speed with which the events were 
unfolding, the geographical location, and the fact that a person who is 
fearful for their own safety is forced under pressure of events, or may 
be – it is a matter for you to determine these issues because these are 
issues of fact – to make a decision and then to react. 
[S53] This is what the next paragraph in the directions you may think 
is driving at. You will see it in these terms: “In determining whether 
the response of the deceased is reasonable or proportionate, you 
should take into account all of the circumstances, including the way in 
which a person, fearful of his own safety, and forced to react on the 
spur of the moment, may react.” 
[S54] That is simply a paragraph which is really a warning against 
what might be termed an armchair inquiry, that is, with all the 
wisdom of hindsight and no limits as to time to examine these events. 
You must when you do make your examination and you do make your 
determination as to whether you are satisfied beyond reasonable 
doubt that what Mr Harris did was reasonable or proportionate, have 
regard to such pressure, if any, as you believe existed in the events as 
they were unfolding and how people may react in those circumstances. 
[S55] I think that probably that may answer not only question two but 
also question three, but I will read question three as well because it is 
directed to that last paragraph. Question three of your questions was 
in these terms: “Are the remarks about ‘a person fearful for his own 
safety’ to be considered only in terms of Mr Harris’s actions, or the 
actions of a ‘reasonable person’?” 
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[S56] The answer really is that what you are examining is Mr Harris’s 
actions, but you are applying an objective test, that is, essentially the 
test of reasonableness. Has the Crown satisfied you beyond reasonable 
doubt that what he did in escaping was reasonable or proportionate, 
having regard to what the accused did and the fear that that is likely 
to have induced? 
[S57] Let me pass from that to the first questions that you asked. The 
first question is in these terms: “Can Your Honour expand on the 
definitions of ‘reasonable’, ‘proportionate’ in your directions on 
page 2?” 
[S58] Again, members of the jury, I might tell you that that phrase 
“reasonable or proportionate” has been lifted from a decided case, and 
that is the test which the highest appellate court in this country has 
laid down as the test to be applied by juries such as yourselves in the 
situation which confronts you. Remember what I said in the course of 
the summing-up, and that is: It is not suggested that there is any 
distinction between those two words, reasonable or proportionate. 
They are embodying essentially the same concept which is a concept of 
reasonableness. 
[S59] The task which is given to you as the representatives of the 
community, as the jury in this trial, is to give those words “reasonable 
or proportionate” meaning in the context of this case. So it is for you 
give them meaning and for you to determine the yardstick which 
should be applied as reasonable or proportionate in the context of a 
particular situation that confronts you. If I were to elaborate upon 
what “reasonable or proportionate” means, then I may in my 
elaboration simply add other words, and those other words may 
subtract or add to the test which the courts have determined is the 
test that you must apply. 
[S60] So I hope that answer is not unhelpful, but I am afraid it is for 
you as representatives of the community to apply your own common 
sense and community standards in the context of which confronts you 
in this case and determine whether you are satisfied beyond 
reasonable doubt that what Mr Harris did in the situation that 
confronted him was reasonable or proportionate, having regard to 
what the accused did directed towards him and the fear that is likely 
to have engendered. 
[S61] I think that really completes the answer I would propose to give 
to your question. 
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APPENDIX B: INDICTMENT 
INDICTMENT 
NEW SOUTH WALES 
On 27th October 2003, the Director of Public Prosecutions on behalf of 
her Majesty charges that 
RODNEY IVAN KERR 
On 27 October 2002 at Redfern in the state of New South Wales, did 
cause the death of William Christopher HARRIS in circumstances 
amounting to Manslaughter. 
AND THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS FURTHER 
CHARGES THAT:- 
RODNEY IVAN KERR 
On 27 October 2002 at Redfern in the state of New South Wales, did 
threaten unlawful violence towards William Christopher HARRIS, 
and his conduct was such that a person of reasonable firmness if 
present at the scene would have feared for his or her safety. 
AND THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS FURTHER 
CHARGES THAT:- 
RODNEY IVAN KERR 
On 27 October 2002 at Redfern in the state of New South Wales, did 
an unlawful act thereby endangering the safety of William 
Christopher HARRIS on a railway. 
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APPENDIX C: WRITTEN DIRECTIONS REFERRED TO BY JUDGE 
REGINA  v  RODNEY IVAN KERR 
Written Directions 
A. (COUNT 1): MANSLAUGHTER BY AN UNLAWFUL AND 
DANGEROUS ACT 
Before you can convict the accused of manslaughter by an unlawful 
and dangerous act, you must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt:- 
1.  that William Christopher died; 
AND 
2.  that his death was caused by the deliberate act(s) of the accused; 
[see note (i)] 
AND 
3.  that the act(s) of the accused was (were):  
 (a)   unlawful; and 
 (b)   dangerous [see note (ii)]. 
Notes re Manslaughter by an Unlawful and Dangerous Act 
(i)  “Did cause the death” 
The Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the act or acts of 
the accused caused the death of the deceased. 
You should approach the question of causation in a common sense 
non-technical way, appreciating that you are determining criminal 
responsibility for serious criminal offences. 
The test is whether the act or acts of the accused significantly or 
substantially contributed to the death of the deceased. 
Where the conduct of the accused induces in the victim a well-founded 
apprehension of physical harm, such that it was reasonable for the 
victim to seek to escape, then the fact that the death occurs in the 
course of that escape does not break the chain of causation, provided 
the response of the victim was reasonable or proportionate having 
regarding to the nature of the conduct of the accused, and the fear it is 
likely to have provoked. 
In determining whether the response of the deceased is reasonable or 
proportionate, you should take account of all the circumstances, 
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including the way in which a person, fearful for his own safety, and 
forced to react on the spur of the moment, may react. 
It is for the Crown to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the response 
of the deceased was reasonable or proportionate having regard to the 
nature of the conduct of the accused, and the fear it is likely to have 
provoked. 
If you are not satisfied, the accused must be acquitted of 
manslaughter.  Your verdict would be “not guilty” to Count 1. 
(ii) An “unlawful act” 
Where the accused acts recklessly or with the intention of raising in 
the mind of another an apprehension of immediate physical violence, 
that is an assault, and an unlawful act. 
A “dangerous act” 
An act is dangerous if a reasonable person in the position of the 
accused would have realised (whether or not the accused in fact 
realised) that it exposed another person to an appreciable risk of 
serious injury. 
B. ALTERNATIVE (COUNT 2): AFFRAY 
Before you can convict the accused of affray, you must be satisfied 
beyond reasonable doubt:- 
1. that on 27 October 2002 the accused, by acts and words, 
threatened unlawful violence against William Christopher Harris: 
AND 
2. that the accused intended to threaten violence against William 
Christopher Harris, or was aware that his words and acts may 
threaten such violence; 
AND 
3. that the acts and words of the accused were such as would cause 
a person of reasonable firmness, present at the scene, to fear for his 
personal safety. 
C. FURTHER ALTERNATIVE (COUNT 3): RAILWAY CHARGE 
Before you can convict the accused of the offence contained within the 
third count in the indictment, you must be satisfied beyond reasonable 
doubt:- 
1. that on 27 October 2002, William Christopher Harris was a 
person on a railway, namely Redfern Station; 
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AND 
2. that the said day, the accused did an unlawful act, namely, by 
words and conduct, intentionally or recklessly raising in the mind of 
William Christopher Harris an apprehension of immediate physical 
violence; 
AND 
3.  that the accused thereby endangered the safety of William 
Christopher Harris. 
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APPENDIX D: BACK TRANSLATION OF AUSLAN 
INTERPRETATION 
EXTRACT 1 
Now moving on, I would like to talk about the first count on the 
indictment – manslaughter. I want to explain what this count entails 
and what the Crown must prove in order for you to be satisfied of the 
accused’s guilt. Whilst I think it will be useful to provide you with 
some information, I’ll direct the jury only very briefly as I don’t want 
to confuse you. I want to clarify that manslaughter and murder are 
very different under the law. You of course would understand that in 
this trial we are not discussing a charge of murder. In regard to 
proving murder, the Crown would have to prove two elements. Firstly, 
that a person died as a result of the direct actions of an accused 
person; but also that the accused had formed an intention to kill that 
person. So there is a deliberate or intentional act that has caused that 
death or has caused serious harm to the person. Causing serious harm 
to the person is known as “grievous bodily harm”.  
So a murder charge consists of an element of trying to consider what 
might have been happening in the mind of an accused person at the 
time of the event, appreciating their words, their language, their 
behaviour and trying to discern what may have been the intention in 
the accused’s mind – so the charge is dependent on the behaviour and 
whether the person intended to kill the person or to cause them 
grievous bodily harm. So that’s murder and it is clearly very different 
from a charge of manslaughter. Manslaughter is not treated the same 
under the law as murder. Although a person has been killed it is 
considered a less serious charge than murder. The degree of 
responsibility linked to the charge of manslaughter is less than that 
associated with murder. It is still very serious but isn’t treated with 
the same gravity as a charge of murder. In regard to this difference 
between the charges, you must only consider the accused person’s 
behaviour, not form an opinion about his intention, or what might 
have been going on in his mind, what his views were per se. You can 
however make a decision about his words, his language, his behaviour. 
You can objectively step back and analyse his conduct in making your 
decision. 
**We have to consider the position of any reasonable person alighting 
from a train in Redfern.  
Moving on, I want to talk about precise issues for consideration soon 
but at the moment I’d like to distribute some written directions that 
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you can keep throughout the trial. They are marked as exhibit 10. I’m 
going to ask you to read this information for yourselves.  
(APPARENT PAUSE IN PROCEEDINGS) 
Now what I would like to do is explain the information that can be 
found in document on the various pages to clarify what we are talking 
about and then we are going to go back to the first page and I will 
work through the different parts of the paper and explain the various 
aspects in greater detail. 
On the first page we talk about the first count, manslaughter by an 
unlawful act. Under this initial heading there are 3 specific elements 
on the page. Have you read these? The Crown must prove these 
beyond reasonable doubt. In regard to the third element, the act(s) of 
the accused, there are two further aspects to consider. So, there are 
essentially 4 parts under the heading on page 1. I will return to these 
later.  
Please turn to page 2 now. The page is titled “Notes re manslaughter 
by an unlawful and dangerous act”. The phrase directly under the title 
is “Did cause the death”. This phrase is an extract taken directly from 
the wording of the first charge. You can see for yourself if you look to 
the next page. Have a look at page 3 now. It refers to an unlawful act 
and a dangerous act and definitions are offered about what these 
mean, clarifying the terminology. I would like to return to these points 
of information later to discuss them in more detail.  
Now if you could turn to page 4 please. The title is “Alternative 
(count 2) Affray”. This is the alternate, or second option, in charging 
the accused. In relation to the charge of affray, there are also 
3 elements of the count to consider. If you have a look at page 5 the 
title is “Alternative (count 3) railway charge”. Similarly, this 
particular alternate charge also requires 3 elements to satisfy this 
count. This is what the Crown must prove in order to satisfy you 
beyond reasonable doubt. 
So I have concluded my preliminary directions and let’s return to 
page 1 again. As noted, there are 3 elements on this page in relation to 
the accused being charged with manslaughter by an unlawful or 
dangerous act. Please review the language in the introductory passage 
at the top of the page. This language is critical. The words clearly note 
that before you can convict the accused of manslaughter by an 
unlawful and dangerous act you must be satisfied beyond reasonable 
doubt. 
So I am compelled to remind all of you to firstly bear in mind that it is 
the responsibility of the Crown – that the burden of proof lies with the 
Crown to make its case in raising these counts against the accused. 
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Secondly, I must stress that the standard of proof required is also 
significant and must be delivered beyond reasonable doubt.  
Now, let’s have regard for the 3 elements in count 1. William 
Christopher Harris died. This first part of the manslaughter charge is 
a given – there is no question that he is deceased. We know that he 
died at Redfern train station at 12.49 pm on 27 October 2002. He 
suffered multiple injuries after being hit by a train. We all agree on 
that fact it is noted in exhibit marked “0”. So, at the outset we can 
concede the first point in count 1 of the indictment. 
The second part of this count is whether his death was caused by the 
deliberate act of the accused. Meaning that he wilfully caused the 
action as opposed to it being a mistake or an accident. I’m not 
suggesting that Mr Button (the accused’s solicitor) said that his client 
did or didn’t deliberately perform this act, but you need to consider 
this question and decide for yourself beyond a reasonable doubt in 
making a judgment in this matter.  
Further to this second part to count 1. There are two key issues or 
questions in relation to this part, and both questions are very 
important. You have to consider these carefully, they may appear to be 
very basic points but they are integral to this trial. The first key issue 
relates to the act or acts of the accused. What was his behaviour?  
What did he do? What did he say? What was his conduct? The second 
pertinent issue is in relation to chain of causation - whether the 
accused’s behaviour can be directly linked to the victims death. Was 
the accused’s conduct an act that contributed to the death of the 
deceased?  
In relation to the first question under consideration – we know what 
the accused did. Later in my summation, I would like to remind you of 
a few points about the various witnesses that you have heard 
testimony from, and you’ve also seen evidence in exhibit B from the 
video footage that was taken at the train station. So, you’ve already 
seen what actually occurred at the scene at train station.  
You’ve also heard both the prosecution and the defence evidence 
presented during the course of this trial and perhaps you feel you 
know what actually happened. On many points of fact there is little 
disagreement in relation to what happened. I’d like to elaborate on 
this more later, but for now I will note the points of agreement. Both 
counsel present an agreed position that the victim died and that the 
accused and the victim didn’t know each other prior to this event – 
they had never met before. The victim was seated at the train station 
at the far end of the last row of seats on the platform on platform 7 at 
Redfern train station waiting for a train which was soon to arrive on 
platform 6. A train then arrived at platform 7 and the accused person 
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alighted from the train in the vicinity of the victim and sat near the 
victim. Now at this point some disagreement occurs in terms of the 
exact location of the parties concerned, but essentially they were in 
the vicinity of the end of platform 7.  
The accused started talking to the victim, using expressions such as 
‘what the fuck are you looking at?’ ‘what the fuck are you staring at?’ 
or something similar. The accused then started to approach the victim 
and then other people tried to intervene – two women tried to stop the 
accused from getting any closer to the victim. He broke free from the 
two women and came closer to the victim and the women then grabbed 
him again to prevent him from getting too close. He was then 
straining to pull away from the women. You’ve seen all this on the 
video footage already.  
According to all the witnesses, there is only one different aspect to the 
testimony. All of the witnesses agreed that no physical contact 
occurred between the victim and the accused. The accused didn’t 
actually touch the victim at any time. Now the Crown have stressed 
this is not part of their case – they are not arguing that the accused 
assaulted or came into physical contact with the victim. At all times 
there was a distance between the two groups or the two parties 
roughly of about two metres, some people have said as much as 
10 metres separated the parties, and other people have said 
somewhere between two to 10 metres. Mr Button, the accused’s 
solicitor, has said that Mr Mikulic, another witness, more precisely 
believes it was four to eight metres. Mr Harris, the victim, ignored the 
taunts from the accused and did not respond to the accused. Of his 
own accord, he got up and moved to his right, around behind the row 
of seating and proceeded to walk, not in hurried fashion, to the edge of 
the platform and then he jumped down onto the train tracks.  
This is the point where the testimony starts to differ as to how he got 
down onto the tracks. It appeared initially he was looking north to the 
city to see if the train was coming soon. But some other witnesses 
presented other stories about what happened next, some stating the 
victim was looking in different directions at this point, including 
looking back at the group of the people where the accused had 
remained on platform 6/7. At some time while the victim was still on 
the tracks a woman on the platform called out to him to say the train 
was coming. The woman turned to watch the train approaching – it 
was coming up to platform 5. I believe all the witnesses agree that 
shortly after the woman calling out that a train was coming that the 
train signal was sounded very loudly. At that point, most people said 
that the man quickly tried to get off the tracks at that point as the 
train was coming. He got to the edge of the tracks, but could not pull 
himself back up onto the platform in time. He was scrambling up and 
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had his hands up near the edge of the platform and you can see the 
photos in exhibit F that demonstrate that he was trying to do that 
when at that point the train struck him and that he died from his 
serious injuries.  
This series of events all happened in a relatively short space of time. 
You can note the time for yourselves. If you regard the video footage 
you will see that there is a time and date stamp on the footage, as well 
as on the photo images of the station happenings. So for example, 
photo number 3 shows the time of the first train arriving when the 
accused first alighted and that was at 12.45 and 37 seconds that photo 
was taken. Then at 12.46 and 5 seconds exhibit photograph E shows 
the man trying to get up onto the edge of the platform just prior to the 
train colliding with him.  
In my estimation then, and you don’t have to take my word for it, the 
series of events took place in approximately 28 seconds, or less than 
half a minute during which all of this occurred.  
It is apparent that it was a very short duration of time. How can you 
make a decision in regard to the first count then? You need to consider 
the facts of the incident in relation to the first charge. So what the 
accused did…consider the accused’s behaviour, what he said, and his 
words to the victim and whether you feel satisfied that this was 
indeed what occurred.  
Now I would like to turn your attention to the second element of 
count 1. This element is important, in fact critical. The second element 
of the manslaughter count is in regard to causation – whether the 
accused’s behaviour contributed to or substantially influenced the 
victim’s behaviour. Just as in your course of everyday life there is 
clearly a chain of causation that occurs. You can see that if you do 
something whereby something else eventuates as a result of an initial 
incident, that there may well be a causal link between these two 
matters. You have to consider the context of situations carefully to 
decide whether the latter result that occurred was linked to the initial 
incident.  
The law operates in a similar fashion. Lawyers must consider a series 
of events in context to determine whether there is a chain of causation 
– whether cause and effect are linked. In this example please use your 
common sense. You must consider the chain of events – whether the 
incidents that occurred are all linked to one another. Members of the 
jury, you have to consider your significant legal duty in determining 
criminal responsibility very carefully. It requires very serious and 
thoughtful deliberation before making a decision in relation to this 
matter. 
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**So, causation may be able to be applied if the accused’s actions did 
cause the death of the victim, however causation may also play a role 
in the context of the other alternate counts in this matter which I will 
address in more detail later.  
Counts 2 and 3 do include the question of causation. If you review the 
written directions in regard to Count 2 – Affray – please have a look 
now for yourselves by reading page 4. In regard to Count 2, there are 
three elements that must be satisfied, and the third element makes 
reference specifically to the accused’s acts and words. Whether these 
were such as would create a sense of apprehension and cause a person 
of reasonable firmness, present at the scene, to fear for his personal 
safety and want to flee the scene. Once again, this element relates to a 
potential chain of causation – that the actions of the accused may be 
directly linked to the resulting response of the victim. It must be 
considered whether such behaviour on the part of the accused would 
contribute to a sense of trepidation in the mind of a reasonable person. 
Please approach the question of causation using your common sense, 
rather than in a technical manner, appreciating you are determining 
criminal responsibility for serious criminal offences. 
Again returning to page 5, the third count is the railway charge and 
the wording of element 3 makes specific reference to you being 
satisfied that the accused person made the victim feel a sense of 
apprehension or fear. That the accused’s conduct then caused the 
victim to flee and led him to go down onto the train track where he 
was then struck by a train. You must carefully consider that matter. 
According to the written directions, I would now like to return to 
count 1 again, the charge of manslaughter. It is possible that the 
victim’s death was as a result of many factors. The burden isn’t on the 
Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused’s 
behaviour was the only cause leading to the victim’s death. For 
example, the train was actually what caused the death of the victim, 
quite obviously, so the nature of causation, what is it really?  
You have to consider whether the accused’s conduct significantly and 
substantially contributed to, and ultimately caused, the death of the 
deceased. The deceased himself by his own conduct of getting onto the 
tracks clearly contributed to the final result of death, however the 
accused can end up with a jail sentence in relation to this charge. 
Naturally the victim shouldn’t have jumped onto the tracks in front of 
an oncoming train. You have to be satisfied then beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the accused’s conduct significantly influenced the victim’s 
response and caused the victim’s death. 
In some other cases of manslaughter, the question of causation is 
sometimes very simple to demonstrate. For example, if someone 
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assaults a person and they die of a head injury from a fall after 
receiving punch then causation is very easy to prove as the chain of 
causation is quite evident. Such a case would be relatively simple to 
determine. This particular case is more difficult and in this case the 
link of causation may be less evident and is more complex.  
Much of the test for chain of causation in this instance is in regard to 
the response of the victim. You need to consider the reaction of the 
victim in response to the accused’s conduct. Did the accused’s conduct 
lead to a well-founded sense of apprehension on the part of the victim? 
Did he fear physical harm, such that it was reasonable for him to seek 
to escape? If so, then the fact that the death occurs in the course of 
that escape does not breach the link in the chain of causation. If the 
Crown can satisfy you beyond a reasonable doubt that the response of 
the victim in this situation was reasonable and proportionate with 
regard to the nature of the conduct of the accused. 
So you have to deliberate a few different issues. You have to consider 
the accused’s conduct – what he did and what he said. Secondly 
whether his conduct in regard to the victim did a cause a sense of 
apprehension of assault and in fear of his safety, caused the victim to 
flee and whether this was a reasonable response in such 
circumstances. So you must objectively consider whether the conduct 
of the accused led to the victim’s death, and furthermore whether the 
response of the deceased was in proportion to the nature of the 
conduct of the accused and the fear it is likely to have provoked. 
Would any reasonable person also respond this way in the same 
situation? Would the members of the jury respond in this manner if in 
the same circumstances? So, whether the victim’s response was 
reasonable and proportionate and in line with the response likely from 
other reasonable persons.  
You must take account of all the circumstances, and the short time 
span in which all this occurred, of only 28 seconds. This includes the 
way in which a person, fearful for his safety, and forced to react on the 
spur of the moment, may react. 
It may be contextually very different for you to sit comfortably with no 
time pressures and to ponder at length as to how this person should 
have reacted. This person didn’t have the luxury of considering over a 
course of time as to how they might react in this situation but instead 
made a spur of the moment decision, so you have to try and put 
yourself in the shoes of the victim who acted very quickly.  
It is the responsibility of the Crown to demonstrate the burden of 
proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused’s conduct did cause 
the death of the victim. That the victim’s response was reasonable or 
proportionate to the nature of the provocation from the accused.   
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If you are not satisfied the Crown has met its burden, or if you have 
any doubts at all, you must find the accused not guilty in relation to 
count 1.  
I say reasonable or proportionate not necessarily because I want to 
differentiate between the two. We have to think about the notion of 
reasonableness and what is reasonable to the regular person and what 
they might do in the same situation. The concept of reasonableness is 
a test as to what people might do – it is an objective test, not a 
subjective test of what you might think, but an objective assessment of 
the situation. Ask yourself, was the victim’s response reasonable in 
regard to the nature of the accused’s conduct. If the answer is yes, 
then you may consider the accused did cause the death of the victim. 
However, if you consider the victim’s reaction to the accused 
unreasonable and disproportionate, then this would mean the events 
are not causally linked and you cannot make a determination of 
guilty.  
How to solve the problem doesn’t depend on the accused’s view of what 
he thinks he would do. It’s a more detached objective view. Your 
decision also doesn’t depend on the victim’s character or personality. 
You must distance yourself from judgments about that. You have to 
consider only the victim’s response to the conduct of the accused and 
whether you feel there was a chain of causation occurring there. The 
character and personality of the accused is also not relevant to this 
specific question of law. A lot of people have talked about the 
character of the accused, but this is not relevant, you must only 
consider the question of the reasonableness of the response of the 
victim.  
You may well ask me if there is any relevant evidence to consider 
when trying to establish the character of the parties. I think everyone 
has agreed or indicated that the victim was a non-confrontational 
person and was not an assertive or aggressive personality. This 
particular evidence may be important to consider. So what was it 
about the accused’s conduct that led the victim to feel a sense of 
apprehension? When you consider the conduct of the accused, was it to 
such an extent that a fear for his safety on the part of the victim was 
reasonable, or was the nature of conduct disproportionate to the 
response? This is for you to deliberate.  
Do you feel that that the accused was behaving sufficiently 
provocatively, that his personality or the character of the victim was 
influential in him trying to flee the situation because the accused’s 
conduct gave him a well-founded apprehension of physical harm and 
that it was reasonable for him to want to flee the scene? Or is it 
perhaps the case that the victim did not get up due to the language or 
the conduct of the accused per se, but rather because the victim’s own 
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personality type meant that he did not want to engage in any 
confrontational situation. 
So that is how the evidence about the emotional substance of the 
victim may have some relevance in regard to the victim’s character. It 
may be relevant and indeed important to consider the character of the 
deceased. He was 44 years of age and had no disabilities. You must 
consider whether there is a chain of causation between the conduct of 
the accused and the response of the victim and whether such a 
response was reasonable and proportionate. Think about the fact that 
he sought to escape and whether such an action was reasonable 
enough in the circumstances. Consider his character and his physical 
fitness.  
If it had been a different person, perhaps, for example, someone with a 
mobility disability would they have responded differently? Two people 
in the same circumstances may have responded differently. So his 
body and physical fitness may also be relevant and also his emotional 
character in being reluctant to court confrontation may also be 
relevant. Everyone seemed to agree the victim was a passive type of 
character and that is only relevant to thinking about in regard to his 
response to his perception of the accused’s conduct and as to whether 
his apprehension was well-founded. Was his reaction to flee as a result 
of the accused’s conduct, or due to the influence of his own character 
type in wanting to avoid the accused? If the victim was fearful that he 
may be harmed in that situation and the conduct of the accused 
induced in the victim a sense of apprehension, would other reasonable 
persons in the same circumstance have felt the same way and reacted 
in the same way? 
Members of the jury, we are approaching lunchtime now and I think it 
is an appropriate time to adjourn proceedings for lunch. We will close 
now and we will resume shortly after 2 o’ clock this afternoon. You can 
take the video with you. 
EXTRACT 2 
Good morning, members of the jury. When we concluded yesterday, 
you tendered some issues in a document that has since been labelled 
exhibit 11. There were some terms noted in the document and I would 
like to read that for you now and respond to the issues that you 
presented to me. 
The document consists of three sections. The first section requests, can 
the judge please expand on what is meant by reasonable or 
proportionate according to the information on page 2 in the notes 
given to the jury two days ago? These would be the written directions 
with the heading “Did cause the death”.  
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The second section of the document I have received from you queries 
whether you should consider the deceased in this matter, Mr Harris, 
or other victims generally. Specifically, Mr Harris or other victims 
generally?  
In the third section of the document, you query the issue of 
apprehension for his personal safety. You ask if you must only 
consider Mr Harris’s response, or the response of other reasonable 
persons in the same situation. 
In paragraph 5 on page 2, there are some questions also. You asked 
me three questions at the end of yesterday. I don’t want to answer 
immediately in relation to some of these particular questions that you 
have asked. I think I will defer responding to the queries you raise in 
the first section and instead will address your questions relating to the 
second section of the document. 
In regard to your second question, I will read the information again 
now to refresh your memory.  
Your comments are about the deceased. You ask if the information 
relates to him specifically or whether it relates to other reasonable 
persons. In responding to your issues, I have asked my Clerk of Courts 
to distribute a copy of your queries back to you in case you do not have 
a copy of the letter you provided to me yesterday so you can re-
acquaint yourself with the specific comments.  
So to offer you a brief response to your issues…in regard to the middle 
paragraph on page 2, you ask was there a deliberate act on the part of 
the accused towards the victim? We will speak more on that point 
shortly. On my page 2, paragraph 2, it talks about Rodney Kerr, the 
accused person, and the victim, William Christopher Harris, who is 
the deceased. I would like to expand somewhat with my response to 
clarify what I mean and what you need to consider and assess before 
making your decision. I think it might be valuable to read the written 
directions again to ensure they are uppermost in your mind in terms 
of the guidelines I gave you two days ago in regard to causation. It 
would be helpful to review these once more. I know you may have read 
these written directions six or more times already, but please have a 
look at page 2. The sub-heading notes “Did cause the death”. That is 
the precise wording on the paper. 
The Crown must have proved beyond reasonable doubt that the 
accused’s conduct created a chain of causation that led to the 
deceased’s death. You must carefully deliberate the causation issue, 
approaching the question in a common sense non-technical manner. 
You have to determine criminal responsibility here in regard to a very 
serious crime. You are charged with the duty of considering whether 
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the act or acts of the accused significantly or substantially influenced 
the victim by inducing a fear for his personal safety and causing him 
to flee, which led to his death. 
In the following paragraph, you specifically ask question number 2, 
whether the accused’s conduct induced in the victim a well-founded 
apprehension of physical harm, and to such an extent that any 
reasonable person would have felt the same in the same situation and 
if, in seeking to escape, then the fact that the death occurs in the 
course of the escape does not break the link in the chain of causation? 
One issue for determination is whether the victim’s response was 
reasonable or proportionate in relation to the nature and extent of the 
accused’s conduct. If the conduct was sufficient to have provoked such 
fear and apprehension resulting in the person fleeing, then it is. 
It would be useful to read in more depth now, and return to this 
section later for further discussion.  
In order to establish a context for the next section, I’d like to read it 
again for you. In considering whether the victim’s response was 
reasonable and proportionate in regard to the accused’s conduct, you 
must take into account all of the circumstances of the matter, 
including the manner in which any reasonable person fearful for his 
own safety and forced to react on the spur of the moment may react in 
the same situation.  
The Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim’s 
response would be in keeping with any other reasonable person based 
on the accused’s conduct. Maybe the accused’s behaviour created a 
heightened sense of fear in the victim. If you are dissatisfied and have 
any doubts at all, you must find the accused not guilty on count 1 of 
manslaughter. So the specific finding would be “not guilty on count 1”.  
Moving on now from the written directions and the chain of causation. 
If you return to page 2, the middle paragraph talks about the victim, 
the person that was injured in this instance. I would like to explain 
the paragraph including the term ‘victim’ has been cited from another 
case – a matter which appeared in front of the High Court of 
Australia, the uppermost court of Australia. That is why it has been 
referred to in this sense. It has simply been adopted from another case 
and applied in this trial. A judgment in the other matter resulted in a 
specific test or ruling and, in a legal context, we can use other findings 
from other trials and cases to provide a test for application across 
other contexts. So the other trial established a general rule or test 
about the concept of a ‘victim’ and the ‘accused’ and then that had 
been used and applied in this case, in relation to the victim and the 
accused. You must understand this general rule can then be linked to 
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this trial in that Mr Harris is the victim in this instance and Mr Kerr 
is the accused.  
In reading further into the middle paragraph on page 2 in relation to 
the victim, I note there are a few separate issues that may need to be 
explained by me more clearly to help you make a decision and to help 
you understand the decision-making process more comprehensively.  
The first issue is the accused’s conduct - what did he say, what did he 
do? I think it would be agreed and will not be a point of contention 
because the counsel for both parties have already given their address 
on this, but this is my opinion, that the evidence in this matter points 
to the accused clearly directing his actions against the victim. All 
would agree that the victim was directly targeted, so you need to 
consider what exactly did the accused say, what exactly did the 
accused do? That is the primary issue for you to consider and is the 
most important factor in the decision-making process in regard to 
other considerations you must later make, in that it is the first issue 
to contemplate.  
The second issue for you to carefully deliberate is whether the 
accused’s conduct – regardless of whatever that may have been – 
induced in the victim a sense of apprehension of physical harm and 
concern for his personal safety, and whether such extent of fear 
provoked was reasonable in regard to the extent and nature of the 
accused’s conduct. 
It is an objective test, not a subjective consideration, but an objective 
view of the chain of events. I will elaborate on what I mean by this. In 
considering the victim’s reaction and his sense of fear, was the person 
himself the kind of person that would experience trepidation more 
than any other reasonable person? If it was another person in the 
same place of this particular victim would they have responded in the 
same way? Would another reasonable person have felt the same 
extent of trepidation should the accused’s conduct be directed at them?  
It doesn’t mean that the victim’s own reaction to the incident at 
Redfern train station isn’t important – certainly his reaction in this 
instance is important to regard. 
** It certainly isn’t a quick decision you can make, but it was a spur of 
the moment decision for the victim in the circumstances that led on to 
other consequences. 
It is an objective assessment of the situation. You must consider the 
victim’s response and judge objectively whether you think that 
whatever the accused’s conduct and actions may have been, and given 
what he did and what he said, that the victim in listening and 
observing the conduct of the accused felt sufficiently threatened in 
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that place at the end of that platform at that time of night or day in 
the same situation would a reasonable person when experiencing that 
conduct or in hearing that language feel the same extent of trepidation 
as Harris did? Using the same language from the text, was there a 
‘well-founded apprehension of physical harm”? That is essentially the 
second issue for you to deliberate. 
So the first issue is in regard to what Mr Kerr did or didn’t do, and the 
second issue is, regardless of what he did, whether then his behaviour 
was causally linked to the fear for personal safety on the part of the 
victim.  
The third issue is perhaps related to the first two concerns. It comes 
from section 2 again, meaning whether it was reasonable for the 
victim to have felt his only course of escape was to do what he did. 
Again, this is an objective test. You are not a subjective party in this 
incident. You need to consider whether the course of action was 
appropriate in that situation, that as the accused approached the 
victim and as the sense of apprehension on the part of the victim 
developed to such an extent that he was fearful of his personal safety 
given what he was hearing and what he was seeing. That he was 
fearful of physical harm and that this led him to react in the way that 
he did by fleeing. That is essentially the third key issue for you to 
consider, how reasonable it was for him to seek to escape. 
The fourth matter for you to consider is dependent on how you answer 
whether it was reasonable for him to feel such a sense of fear and to 
try to escape. Perhaps you consider it was reasonable to seek escape 
given the circumstances. However, you may feel it was not reasonable 
for him to try escape – that his apprehension wasn’t well-founded or 
that it was based on a weakness in the character of the victim, then 
you do not need to consider the matter any further. 
However, if in regard to the third issue, that you do believe his sense 
of apprehension was well-founded, and that it was legitimate for him 
to seek a route of escape from the situation due to the accused’s 
conduct, then you do need to consider a fourth issue. 
The fourth issue is essentially how the victim chose to escape and 
what his possible options for escape were. We know how he ultimately 
decided to flee – he jumped down onto the train tracks, perhaps in an 
endeavour to cross the tracks and to reach the next platform along, 
platform 5. We know that’s how he died, whilst on the track. However, 
the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the deceased’s 
death occurred as a result of the accused’s conduct.  
The paragraph in the middle of page 2 addresses a question to me as 
presented yesterday afternoon. The question is in regard to if you are 
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not satisfied that the victim’s death was caused by the accused’s 
actions. The Crown must satisfy you beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the victim’s decision to flee to safety over on platform 5 was 
reasonable and was substantially caused by the accused’s conduct, 
which induced a well-founded apprehension in the victim. Once again 
then, we return to the initial consideration of the accused’s conduct in 
this instance and whether the victim’s apprehension was reasonably 
induced from the acts of the accused.   
Again, it is an objective test. A consideration taking into account all 
the circumstances and the notion of ‘reasonableness’. Your perception 
of whether the victim’s response was reasonable and in proportion 
with the nature of the accused’s conduct, leading to his decision to 
escape, is important. Members of the jury, it is for you to decide 
whether the response in seeking to escape was reasonable and 
proportionate having regard to the nature of the conduct of the 
accused and the fear it is likely to have provoked.  
Further, in relation to question 4, you have to think about the context 
where the event occurred, the situation including how it happened and 
the fact that it was a very rapid series of events. Consider where 
people were placed during the incident, and the extent of trepidation 
experienced by the victim, in being concerned for his personal safety 
and in being forced to react on the spur of the moment. So you need to 
deliberate these four main questions. We have many facts available to 
us. We know the facts, we know the times, we know decisions and the 
reactions taken.  
I’d like to move onto the bottom paragraph on page 2.  In reading this, 
you’ll see that the particular phrasing requires you to consider to 
decide whether you think the victim’s reaction was a reasonable 
response and in proportion to the conduct exhibited by the accused. 
You must take into account all of the factors and circumstances, 
including whether any other reasonable person would feel the same 
fear or apprehension and possibly react in the same way that the 
victim did given the limited time available to him, or not.  
That is just referring back to that latter paragraph and offering you a 
reminder of the point also that you now have the luxury of time and a 
considered response to this incident – you should not however take 
your time in considering all of this. You must quickly come to a 
decision, and ensure in making such a decision that you feel satisfied 
beyond reasonable doubt that the response was a reasonable and 
proportionate reaction to the accused’s conduct. Bear in mind the time 
pressures on the victim at that instant as well and the fact the series 
of events occurred in rapid succession. Consider whether a reasonable 
person in the same situation would have reacted in the same way or 
not.  
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There is some difficulty with question 2 and question 3, I’ll read 
question 3 again. Because it is related to the last paragraph on page 2, 
question number 3 from yesterday that you provided to me refers to a 
person who fears for their own safety and you ask me if you are to 
consider this only in relation specifically to Harris or in relation to any 
reasonable person. My answer to that then is that you have to 
consider only the specific victim’s response in this case. However, you 
can objectively consider the situation and apply the test of 
reasonableness and whether another reasonable person would do the 
same. You may ask yourself whether the Crown has satisfied you 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim fleeing from the situation 
was a reasonable and proportionate response to the accused’s conduct. 
Consider the accused’s conduct and the possible extent of 
apprehension experienced by the victim. 
Returning your attention now to question 1, your first question 
presented to me from yesterday was “can Your Honour please 
elaborate on what is meant by reasonable and in proportion?” on 
page 2. Again, members of the jury, I can advise you that this phase 
“reasonable and proportionate” has been adopted from findings in 
other cases. The test used in the High Court of Australia is the test 
used for this matter and it is a test based on the ordinary man in the 
street, persons just like you and is a test developed for application in 
situations such as the matter we have before us now. 
If you will recall in summing up, I noted that I wouldn’t like to 
particularly differentiate between the terms reasonable and 
proportionate. In essence they are the same. It means that the 
response was fair enough – that it was what would be expected of any 
other sensible person in the same situation. Your position as members 
of the jury carries a grave responsibility. You are representing the 
wider community. You are the members of the jury selected for this 
particular trial and therefore are charged with the responsibility of 
defining the terms reasonable and proportionate and trying to attach 
meaning to the terms within the context of this trial. It is with your 
judgment that you may consider what is reasonable and what is 
proportionate with regard to the facts of the matter in this trial, given 
the specific context and situation of this case.   
Given you are charged with this purpose, I do not want to elaborate 
any further on defining proportionate and reasonableness because I 
might add in further terms that may cause some confusion to you or 
reduce your understanding further. So you really need to consider 
yourself on how you apply this test in this case without further input 
from me. 
I hope that my answers have been helpful. You are however charged 
with the responsibility of representing your community and you must 
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use your common sense and apply a community standard as to what 
you may think would be an appropriate result for this trial. In making 
your decision you must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the 
victim’s response was reasonable and in proportion with the nature of 
the accused’s conduct and that it induced a well-founded apprehension 
for his safety. I think that concludes my response to your questions. 
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APPENDIX E: RECRUITMENT FLYER/POSTER 
    
Do you like watching ‘Law and Order’ or other legal TV shows or 
films? 
Can you read and understand English? 
Have you ever wondered what it would be like to serve on a jury? 
Would you like to be involved in a research study as a jury member? 
IF YOU SAID ‘YES’ TO ALL THESE QUESTIONS, THEN PLEASE 
CONSIDER PARTICIPATING IN A NEW AND INNOVATIVE 
RESEARCH PROJECT*. 
Jemina Napier (Linguistics) and David Spencer (Law) of Macquarie 
University are conducting a study to investigate deaf jurors’ access to 
court proceedings via sign language interpreting, with the assistance 
of research assistant Joe Sabolcec. The aim of the project is to compare 
deaf jurors’ comprehension of a judge’s summation through 
interpreting with non-deaf jurors’ understanding by listening.   
This project will lead to recommendations as to whether deaf people 
can serve as jurors in NSW. 
If you are interested in serving as a jury member in this research 
project please contact Joe Sabolcec by Monday 10th April 2006 (email: 
joe.sabolcec@bigpond.com) for more details.  
Your involvement will involve approximately two hours on campus, 
and you will receive a $25 gift card for your time and trouble. 
We look forward to hearing from you. 
*If you are a law student or have any knowledge of sign language or 
deafness you cannot be involved in the project. 
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APPENDIX F: COMPREHENSION TEST QUESTIONS 
1. Mr Harris was hit by a train at Redfern. True or false? 
2. The Crown or the solicitor for the prosecution has to prove the 
accused was guilty of the offence. True or false? 
3. There were no witnesses to what happened when Mr Harris 
died. True or false? 
4. The offence of murder has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. 
True or false? 
5. To prove murder it must be established: 
a. only that the accused caused the death of the victim. 
b. that the accused caused and intended to cause the death of 
the victim. 
c. that the accused caused the death of the victim without 
intention. 
d. that the accused only intended to cause the death of the 
victim but death did not actually occur. 
6. Mr Harris and Mr Kerr: 
a. went to school together. 
b. were brothers. 
c. were work colleagues. 
d. were strangers to each other. 
7. Manslaughter is: 
a. killing without the intention to kill. 
b. recklessly killing. 
c. killing recklessly with intention to kill. 
d. only committing grievous bodily harm. 
8. When Mr Kerr got off the train he: 
a. hit Mr Harris. 
b. pushed Mr Harris off the platform. 
c. yelled but did not touch Mr Harris. 
d. told Mr Harris to run away. 
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9. Explain what witnesses said the two women with Mr Kerr did. 
10. Explain the legal rule of ‘causation’. 
11. Explain what witnesses said Mr Kerr yelled at Mr Harris when 
he saw Mr Harris. 
12. In assessing the actions of Mr Harris in response to the actions 
of Mr Kerr, explain what you, as a juror, must take into 
consideration. 
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APPENDIX G: CHARACTERISTICS OF JUROR PARTICIPANTS 
Table 7.1: Characteristics of hearing ‘jurors’ 
  Participant 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Gender M M M F F F 
Age range 18-30 31-49 50+ 18-30 31-49 50+ 
Highest 
educational 
attainment 
Tertiary 
(TAFE) 
HSC 
 
Tertiary 
(TAFE) 
Tertiary 
(TAFE) 
Tertiary 
(university) 
School 
certificate 
Employment 
category 
Manual/ 
Trade/ 
Paraprofessional 
White collar/ 
professional 
White collar/ 
professional 
White collar/ 
professional 
White collar/ 
professional 
White collar/ 
professional Va
ria
bl
es
 
First 
language 
English Italian English English Korean English 
 
Table 7.2: Characteristics of deaf ‘jurors’ 
 
  Participant 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Gender M M M F F F 
Age range 18-30 31-49 50+ 18-30 31-49 50+ 
Highest 
educational 
attainment 
Tertiary 
(university) 
Tertiary 
(TAFE) 
Tertiary 
(TAFE) 
Tertiary 
(university) 
HSC School 
certificate 
Employment 
category 
White 
collar/ 
professional 
Manual/ 
Trade/ 
Paraprofessional 
Manual/ 
Trade/ 
Paraprofessional 
White 
collar/ 
professional 
Not in 
workforce 
(student) 
Manual/ 
Trade/ 
Paraprofessional 
Va
ria
bl
es
 
First 
language 
English Auslan Auslan English Auslan Auslan 
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APPENDIX H: ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF KEY LEGAL 
CONCEPTS IN ORIGINAL SUMMATION AND BACK TRANSLATION 
[Note the notation “S” refers to paragraphs in the Judge’s Summation. 
The notation “BT” relates to paragraphs in the Back Translation] 
Key legal concept No 1 – defining “manslaughter” 
[S6] Now, this is quite different to the issue that arises in 
manslaughter. Manslaughter is an unlawful killing falling short of 
murder. The criminal culpability attaching to manslaughter is less 
than murder, although it is still a very serious criminal offence. The 
difference in very broad terms is that you judge whatever are the 
actions of the accused, not according to what he intended, that is, his 
subjective state of mind, but rather his words and actions are 
examined from an objective viewpoint. The measure of responsibility 
is that of a reasonable person in his position getting off the train at 
Redfern; what such a person would have appreciated in the 
circumstances. 
[BT3] Manslaughter is not treated the same under the law as murder. 
Although a person has been killed it is considered a less serious 
charge than murder. The degree of responsibility linked to the charge 
of manslaughter is less than that associated with murder. It is still 
very serious but isn’t treated with the same gravity as a charge of 
murder. In regard to this difference between the charges, you must 
only consider the accused person’s behaviour, not form an opinion 
about his intention, or what might have been going on in his mind, 
what his views were per se. You can however make a decision about 
his words, his language, his behaviour. You can objectively step back 
and analyse his conduct in making your decision. We have to consider 
the position of any reasonable person alighting from a train in 
Redfern.  
 Comment: The issue of the difference between murder and 
manslaughter, that being the mens rea or intention to commit a crime 
is accurately translated. However, the “reasonable person test is not 
well-translated. The summation clearly directs the jury to consider “the 
measure of responsibility being that of a reasonable person stepping off 
a train at Redfern”. The back translation states, “You can however 
make a decision about his words, language, his behaviour”. Although, 
the use of the word “objectively” is used in the very next sentence, I am 
not sure that the average juror would understand the term “objectively” 
without the use of the example of the reasonable person. I think this is 
a problem in this part of the translation. 
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Key legal concept No 2 – the first element of manslaughter 
[S14] Let me go to the elements, and you will see that the first 
element is “that William Christopher Harris died”. There is, of course, 
no issue that Mr Harris died at the Redfern railway station at 
12.49 pm on 27 October 2002, having received multiple injuries after 
having been struck by a train. Indeed, that is an agreed fact in 
exhibit O, I think it is the first agreed fact. So clearly element 1 will 
occasion you no difficulty. 
[BT11]Now, let’s have regard for the three elements in count 1. 
William Christopher Harris died. This first part of the manslaughter 
charge is a given – there is no question that he is deceased. We know 
that he died at Redfern train station at 12.49 pm on 27 October 2002. 
He suffered multiple injuries after being hit by a train. We all agree 
on that fact it is noted in exhibit marked “0”. So, at the outset we can 
concede the first point in count 1 of the indictment. 
Comment: No problems here. 
Key legal concept No 2 – the second element of manslaughter 
[S15] Let me move at once to element 2. You will see it there: “2: That 
his death was caused by the deliberate attack or attacks of the 
accused”, and deliberate in this context simply means voluntarily or 
willed as opposed to something that may happen by mistake or 
accident or something that is a reflex action, something that is not 
willed. It is not being suggested by Mr Button on behalf of Mr Kerr 
that the actions of his client were not deliberate in that sense, but it is 
a matter in respect of which you must be satisfied beyond reasonable 
doubt. 
[S16] Now, this second element, I should say, really involves two 
questions, and indeed, both questions are important, you may think 
fundamental, to this trial. The first concerns the actions of Mr Kerr. 
Exactly what did he do or say? What were his acts? And the second 
issue is concerned with causation. Whatever Mr Kerr may have said 
or done, can it be said that that caused the death of William 
Christopher Harris? 
[BT12] The second part of this count is whether his death was caused 
by the deliberate act of the accused. Meaning that he wilfully caused 
the action as opposed to it being a mistake or an accident. I’m not 
suggesting that Mr Button (the accused’s solicitor) said that his client 
did or didn’t deliberately perform this act, but you need to consider 
this question and decide for yourself beyond a reasonable doubt in 
making a judgment in this matter.  
[BT13] Further to this second part to count 1. There are two key 
issues or questions in relation to this part, and both questions are very 
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important. You have to consider these carefully, they may appear to be 
very basic points but they are integral to this trial. The first key issue 
relates to the act or acts of the accused. What was his behaviour?  
What did he do? What did he say? What was his conduct? The second 
pertinent issue is in relation to chain of causation - whether the 
accused’s behaviour can be directly linked to the victim’s death. Was 
the accused’s conduct an act that contributed to the death of the 
deceased?  
Comment: The only comment here would be the subtle difference 
between the summation referring to acts that “caused the death” of the 
victim compared to the back translation that refers to acts that 
“contributed to the death” of the victim. An act or acts that contribute to 
someone’s death is different to an act or acts that cause someone’s 
death. The accused may have contributed to the death but his act may 
not have caused the death. 
Key legal concept No 3 – test of “causation” 
[S25] But returning to count one, that is the count dealing with 
manslaughter, an event may have a number of causes. The Crown is 
not obliged to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the conduct of the 
accused was the only cause leading to death; for instance, the action of 
the train was plainly one of the causes and indeed the immediate 
cause of death. So what does “cause” mean in this context? The test is 
whether or not the act or the acts of the accused significantly or 
substantially contributed to the death of the deceased. So that even if 
you were to find that the deceased himself, by his actions, contributed 
to his own death, it would not follow that the accused cannot be 
convicted. The question in that circumstance would be, 
notwithstanding the contribution to his own death made by the 
deceased himself: Can it be said that the Crown has established to 
your satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt that the conduct of the 
accused significantly or substantially contributed to the death of the 
deceased? 
[BT27] According to the written directions I would now like to return 
to count 1 again, the charge of manslaughter. It is possible that the 
victim’s death was as a result of many factors. The burden isn’t on the 
Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused’s 
behaviour was the only cause leading to the victim’s death. For 
example, the train was actually what caused the death of the victim, 
quite obviously, so the nature of causation, what is it really?  
[BT28] You have to consider whether the accused’s conduct 
significantly and substantially contributed to, and ultimately caused, 
the death of the deceased. The deceased himself by his own conduct of 
getting onto the tracks clearly contributed to the final result of death, 
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however the accused can end up with a jail sentence in relation to this 
charge. Naturally the victim shouldn’t have jumped onto the tracks in 
front of an oncoming train. You have to be satisfied then beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accused’s conduct significantly influenced 
the victim’s response and caused the victim’s death.  
Comment: There is a major problem here. The summation clearly 
leaves the interpretation of the evidence to the jury – “So that even if 
you were to find that the deceased himself, by his actions, contributed 
to his own death…” whereas the back translation makes an assumption 
about the interpretation of the evidence – “The deceased himself by his 
own conduct of getting onto the tracks clearly contributed to the final 
result of death…”. A judge never tells the jury how to interpret 
evidence. The jury are called “the tribunal of fact” because their job is 
to establish whether the facts support the charge. The judge is the 
“tribunal of law” and determines questions of law that help the jury in 
their job of only assessing admissible evidence. The translation would 
indicate to the deaf juror that the judge has already decided this issue 
and, therefore, the jury should follow suit. 
Key legal concept No 4 – defining “reasonable” and “proportionate” 
[S30] When I use the phrase “reasonable or proportionate”, I am not 
seeking to draw a distinction between those two words. That is simply 
the formula that is traditionally used, but it embodies essentially the 
one concept; that is, the concept of reasonableness. It is an objective 
test. It is looking at the flow of events, the conduct of Mr Kerr, the 
response of Mr Harris, and asking is the latter a reasonable and 
proportionate response to the former such that the former can be said 
to be a cause. If it was not reasonable or proportionate, then there was 
a break in the chain of causation. 
[S31] So that you can see from the statement that the issue does not 
depend upon Mr Kerr’s view as to what he thought Mr Harris might 
do. It is an objective view; nor does it depend upon the character of the 
deceased. It is an objective view based upon what the deceased did in 
response to the threat made to him, if you find that there was such a 
threat. 
[BT36] I say reasonable or proportionate not necessarily because I 
want to differentiate between the two. We have to think about the 
notion of reasonableness and what is reasonable to the regular person 
and what they might do in the same situation. The concept of 
reasonableness is a test as to what people might do – it is an objective 
test, not a subjective test of what you might think, but an objective 
assessment of the situation. Ask yourself, was the victim’s response 
reasonable in regard to the nature of the accused’s conduct. If the 
answer is ‘yes’, then you may consider the accused did cause the death 
  
Append i c es
 111
of the victim. However, if you consider the victim’s reaction to the 
accused unreasonable and disproportionate then this would mean the 
events are not causally linked and you cannot make a determination 
of guilty.  
[BT37] How to solve the problem doesn’t depend on the accused’s view 
of what he thinks he would do. It’s a more detached objective view. 
Your decision also doesn’t depend on the victim’s character or 
personality. You must distance yourself from judgments about that. 
You have to consider only the victim’s response to the conduct of the 
accused and whether you feel there was a chain of causation occurring 
there ...  
Comment: The back translation is better, in terms of plain English, 
than the summation! The only minor comment is that the summation 
asks the jurors to consider first if there was a threat at all – “It is an 
objective view based upon what the deceased did in response to the 
threat made to him, if you find that there was such a threat” whereas 
the back translation assumes there was a threat, although I admit the 
language is not conclusive. 
Key legal concept No 5 – clarifying the written directions: what did the 
accused do? 
[S46] Analysing that paragraph, that middle paragraph speaking of 
the victim, you will see that it gives rise to a number of separate 
issues, and I think an analysis of that paragraph might clarify the 
way in which you should go about your task. The first issue is:  What 
did the accused do? What did he do or say? I do not think it is in the 
least controversial, having heard counsel’s addresses, although this is 
a comment from me, to say that whatever he did appeared on the 
evidence to be directed at Mr Harris, and Mr Harris is, in the context 
of those actions of the accused, the victim. So that is the first thing, 
you have to make up your mind as to exactly what he did. What 
exactly was it that he said and did, and that is really the first issue, 
and that is the bedrock of whatever inquiry you make which affects 
other issues further down the track. 
[BT58] The first issue is the accused’s conduct - what did he say, what 
did he do? I think it would be agreed and will not be a point of 
contention because the counsel for both parties have already given 
their address on this, but this is my opinion, that the evidence in this 
matter points to the accused clearly directing his actions against the 
victim. All would agree that the victim was directly targeted, so you 
need to consider what exactly did the accused say, what exactly did 
the accused do? That is the primary issue for you to consider and is 
the most important factor in the decision-making process in regard to 
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other considerations you must later make in that it is the first issue to 
contemplate.  
Comment: The summation leaves the question of what the accused did 
to the jury. The judge goes close to commenting on the truth of the 
evidence but ultimately leaves it to the jury by opining  – “ I do not 
think it is in the least controversial …” whereas the back translation 
states on this issue, “All would agree that the victim was directly 
targeted …” This important difference is the difference in leaving facts 
for the jury to determine and the judge directing the jury on accepted 
facts – accepted by him and by implication the jury. 
Key legal concept No 6 – clarifying the written directions: did the 
accused’s actions give rise to a well-founded apprehension of 
physical harm? 
[S47] The second issue is whatever he did, did it give rise to a well-
founded apprehension of physical harm? In other words, was it 
reasonable that Mr Harris should have been fearful of physical harm 
at the hands of Mr Kerr? That is an objective matter, not a subjective 
matter. Let me explain what I mean by that. It does not depend upon 
the reaction of Mr Harris, the determination of that issue. That is, 
whether personally he was in fear; rather, it is a matter for you to 
determine whether objectively a reasonable person in his position 
would have been in fear having regard to what you find were the acts 
of Mr Kerr directed at Mr Harris. 
[S48] That is not to say that Mr Harris’s reaction to whatever 
happened on the station at Redfern is irrelevant to your 
determination, but it does not conclude the matter. It is not 
determinative, it does not determine the outcome. You must stand 
back, having determined in your own mind what you believe Mr Kerr 
did or said on that platform, and say to yourself: Well, was it 
reasonable that a person confronted by that in that situation, that 
geographical situation, that end of the platform, that time of the day, 
that situation, was it reasonable that a person confronted by those 
actions, words and actions, should have been apprehensive of physical 
harm, should have had, to use the phrase which appears in that 
middle paragraph, a well-founded apprehension of physical harm? So 
that is the second issue. 
[BT59] The second issue for you to carefully deliberate is whether the 
accused’s conduct – regardless of whatever that may have been – 
induced in the victim a sense of apprehension of physical harm and 
concern for his personal safety, and whether such extent of fear 
provoked was reasonable in regard to the extent and nature of the 
accused’s conduct. 
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[BT60] It is an objective test, not a subjective consideration but an 
objective view of the chain of events. I will elaborate on what I mean 
by this. In considering the victim’s reaction and his sense of fear, was 
the person himself the kind of person that would experience 
trepidation more than any other reasonable person? If it was another 
person in the same place of this particular victim would they have 
responded in the same way? Would another reasonable person have 
felt the same extent of trepidation should the accused’s conduct be 
directed at them?  
[BT61] It doesn’t mean that the victim’s own reaction to the incident 
at Redfern train station isn’t important – certainly his reaction in this 
instance is important to regard. 
[BT62] ** It certainly it isn’t a quick decision you can make but it was 
a spur of the moment decision for the victim in the circumstances that 
led on to other consequences. 
[BT63] It is an objective assessment of the situation. You must 
consider the victim’s response and judge objectively whether you think 
that whatever the accused’s conduct and actions may have been, and 
given what he did and what he said, that the victim in listening and 
observing the conduct of the accused felt sufficiently threatened in 
that place at the end of that platform at that time of night or day in 
the same situation would a reasonable person when experiencing that 
conduct or in hearing that language feel the same extent of trepidation 
as Harris did? Using the same language from the text, was there a 
‘well-founded apprehension of physical harm”?  That is essentially the 
second issue for you to deliberate. 
Comment: The order of the translation is problematic here. The 
following sentence, “In considering the victim’s reaction and his sense 
of fear, was the person himself the kind of person that would experience 
trepidation more than any other reasonable person?” should have 
appeared at the end of BT59 not mid-way through BT60. It confuses 
the subjective with the objective test. The summation had it in the right 
order. I do not think it is hugely damaging because the objective test is 
clarified, particularly in BT63 – it is just a bit confusing. 
Key legal concept No 7 – clarifying the written directions: was it 
reasonable for the victim to seek to escape? 
[S49] The first issue is what Mr Kerr did. The second issue is, 
whatever he did, did that give rise to a well-founded apprehension of 
fear of physical harm. Then you get to the third issue, which is a 
related issue, and it comes from the phrase which you will see in that 
paragraph “such that it was reasonable for the victim”, that is Mr 
Harris, “to seek escape”. Again, that is an objective matter, and it 
depends upon reasonableness. Was it reasonable for a person in the 
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position of Mr Harris, having been confronted by that conduct, having 
felt that fear of physical harm, to seek to escape? That is the next 
issue, the third issue, being reasonableness and escaping. 
[BT64] So the first issue is in regard to what Mr Kerr did or didn’t do, 
and the second issue is, regardless of what he did, whether then his 
behaviour was causally linked to the fear for personal safety on the 
part of the victim.  
[BT65] The third issue is perhaps related to the first two concerns. It 
comes from section 2 again, meaning whether it was reasonable for 
the victim to have felt his only course of escape was to do what he did. 
Again, this is an objective test. You are not a subjective party in this 
incident. You need to consider whether the course of action was 
appropriate in that situation, that as the accused approached the 
victim and as the sense of apprehension on the part of the victim 
developed to such an extent that he was fearful of his personal safety 
given what he was hearing and what he was seeing. That he was 
fearful of physical harm and that this led him to react in the way that 
he did by fleeing. That is essentially the third key issue for you to 
consider, how reasonable it was for him to seek to escape. 
Comment: The use of the word “causally” in BT64 is wrong – again not 
hugely damaging but confusing as the issue of well-founded 
apprehension of fear is not determinative alone of the issue of causation 
– it merely contributes to the issue of the presence of causation. 
Otherwise, no problems. 
Key legal concept No 8 – clarifying the written directions: was the 
method of escape reasonable and proportionate? 
[S50] The fourth issue assumes to some extent that you answered the 
question: Well, that is what he did, that is the fear he felt, ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
it was reasonable. If you felt it was not reasonable for him to want to 
escape, then that would be the end of that, but if you believed it was 
reasonable for him in that circumstance to seek to escape then you 
come to the fourth issue. This is the issue which concerns the mode of 
escape. We know the mode of escape chosen by Mr Harris was to cross 
the tracks to safety on platform 5. We know that in doing that he met 
his death. But what the Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt is 
that the death was caused by the conduct of the accused, and what 
that paragraph in the middle which is the subject of your questions 
says, there will be a break in the chain of causation, unless the Crown 
satisfies you beyond reasonable doubt that the response of Mr Harris 
in choosing to cross the tracks to the safety of platform 5 was 
reasonable or proportionate, having regard to the conduct of the 
accused and the fear it is likely to have induced, so you are going back 
to the conduct of the accused and the fear it is likely to have induced. 
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[S51] Again, that is an objective inquiry. It is a question of 
reasonableness. It is a question of your view as to whether that was 
reasonable or proportionate for him to do, he having chosen to escape. 
It is a matter for your judgment as to whether that was reasonable or 
proportionate, having regard to the conduct of the accused and the 
fear that it induced. 
[BT66] The fourth matter for you to consider is dependent on how you 
answer whether it was reasonable for him to feel such a sense of fear 
and to try and escape. Perhaps you consider it was reasonable to seek 
escape given the circumstances. However, you may feel it was not 
reasonable for him to try to escape – that his apprehension wasn’t 
well-founded or that it was based on a weakness in the character of 
the victim, then you do not need to consider the matter any further. 
[BT67] However, if in regard to the third issue, that you do believe his 
sense of apprehension was well-founded, and that it was legitimate for 
him to seek a route of escape from the situation due to the accused’s 
conduct, then you do need to consider a fourth issue. 
[BT68] The fourth issue is essentially how the victim chose to escape 
and what his possible options for escape were. We know how he 
ultimately decided to flee – he jumped down onto the train tracks, 
perhaps in an endeavour to cross the tracks and to reach the next 
platform along, platform 5. We know that’s how he died, whilst on the 
track. However, the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the deceased’s death occurred as a result of the accused’s conduct.  
[BT69] The paragraph in the middle of page 2 addresses a question to 
me as presented yesterday afternoon. The question is in regard to if 
you are not satisfied that the victim’s death was caused by the 
accused’s actions. The Crown must satisfy you beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the victim’s decision to flee to safety over on platform 5 was 
reasonable and was substantially caused by the accused’s conduct, 
which induced a well-founded apprehension in the victim. Once again 
then we return to the initial consideration of the accused’s conduct in 
this instance and whether the victim’s apprehension was reasonably 
induced from the acts of the accused.   
[BT70] Again it is an objective test. A consideration taking into 
account all the circumstances and the notion of ‘reasonableness’. Your 
perception of whether the victim’s response was reasonable and in 
proportion with the nature of the accused’s conduct, leading to his 
decision to escape, is important. Members of the jury, it is for you to 
decide whether the response in seeking to escape was reasonable and 
proportionate having regard to the nature of the conduct of the 
accused and the fear it is likely to have provoked.  
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Comment: The reference to the victim escaping because of a “weakness 
in character” in BT66 is wrong and was not mentioned in the 
summation. This is an objective test not an assessment of the victim’s 
character as to whether it was reasonable to escape the threat posed by 
the accused. Otherwise, no problems. 
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